

R-889-PR

November 1971

The Soviet Union in A Period of Strategic Parity

Herbert Goldhamer

A Report prepared for
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

This research is supported by the United States Air Force under Project Rand—Contract No. F44620-67-C-0045—Monitored by the Directorate of Operational Requirements and Development Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Hq USAF. Views or conclusions contained in this study should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of Rand or of the United States Air Force.

R-889-PR

November 1971

The Soviet Union in A Period of Strategic Parity

Herbert Goldhamer

A Report prepared for
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

PREFACE

THIS REPORT is a contribution to Rand's project on New Doctrine and Strategies for Strategic Forces. It is responsive to one of the critical study issues raised by the Project Rand Air Force Advisory Group in November 1970.

The subject discussed here should be of special interest to officers concerned with the development of new U.S. strategic doctrines and concepts, and with their significance for the preparation of Air Force programs in the strategic forces area.

United States Air Force interest in exploring strategic doctrines and concepts appropriate to the military-political environment of the seventies must necessarily take account of strategic doctrines of the Soviets and the probable development of Soviet objectives. A more specific question in this broad area is whether strategic parity or some other aspect of the Soviet situation, especially Communist China, will dominate the evolution of Soviet military-political objectives in the seventies. The present Report addresses itself to this question.

SUMMARY

A GOOD DEAL of Soviet behavior is best understood not so much as the pursuit of a variety of quite particular military and political objectives, but as an attempt to increase her future options, to reduce those of the West, and to provide positions of strength from which she can deal with unanticipated contingencies and pursue objectives which she has not yet formulated.

An examination of the relation of Soviet political-military behavior in both the prewar and postwar periods to the military balance throughout those years does not show a very consistent pattern. There was, however, in various periods a Soviet tendency to act aggressively in positions of military inferiority and only occasionally to pursue a somewhat softer line in periods of national danger. When we view the Soviet strategic position in the broadest sense to take account of political factors favorable to the Soviets, the association of weakness with aggressive behavior is much reduced and Soviet aggressiveness appears associated with a strategic position that is by no means unsatisfactory.

Examination of the historical record suggests that the degree of Soviet aggressiveness is a function not only of the strategic balance but also of certain preferred political strategies, the experience of special failures, the style and character of particular leaders, and Soviet emphasis on political warfare. The strategic balance as an influence has had to vie with these and other influences.

The analysis of Soviet behavior in the seventies places much more emphasis on Soviet concern with her "two-front" position between the West and Red China than on her achievement of nuclear parity/superiority. The analysis concludes that the Soviets have been and are

interested in developing relations with Japan and the West that will lessen the military and political dangers resulting from simultaneous threats and pressures from China and the West.

For the time being the Soviet Union has not felt the situation to be sufficiently critical to make her forego her forward policy in the Third World, her naval activity in distant oceans, or her challenge to United States nuclear power. These activities are likely to be limited, if at all, only at some future time when the US-SU-China triangle has evolved to the point where the United States may have sufficient bargaining power to make these issues subject to explicit or implicit negotiations. In the meantime, Soviet collaborative or concessionary tendencies will manifest themselves largely in terms of (a) attempts to draw Japan and the West into economic commitments in the Soviet Union, and (b) bargaining over issues that have already been opened up such as SALT, European troop reduction, a European security conference, and a Berlin settlement.

The Soviet Union is not at present in a position where she must choose between an exclusively collaborative policy and one that aggressively extends her influence and control around the world. It is likely that for some time, elements of both of these policies, even when they may seem inconsistent, will show up in Soviet behavior.

In the longer-term future, the Soviets will probably find it necessary to opt more largely for one or the other policy, and very likely for a more consistently collaborative one. This latter hypothesis assumes that the United States, Europe, and Japan demonstrate that they have the military, political, and moral strength to counter possible Soviet aggressive moves. Otherwise there will be less need or incentive for the Soviets to pursue a collaborative policy since Western military and political capabilities and national morale will neither enable the West to threaten the Soviet Union in conjunction with China nor to aid her in ensuring that China is neutralized. If Western firmness and preparedness are not undermined, the Soviet Union's relation with Red China will probably dominate Soviet policy in the seventies more than will Soviet attempts to exploit the acquisition of nuclear parity/superiority to seek major gains at the expense of the Western powers.

CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	iii
SUMMARY.....	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
PART I.....	3
Power and the Power Struggle: United States and the Soviet Union Compared.....	4
Strategic Position, Strategic Balance.....	8
Dimensions of Soviet Behavior.....	12
PART II	
The Prewar Period.....	16
Interpretations.....	20
The Postwar Period.....	24
Interpretations.....	32
PART III	
The Seventies.....	37
The Soviet Union and the Third World.....	38
The Communist Countries.....	49
The Soviet Union and Japan.....	56
The Soviet Union and the West.....	59
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	69

INTRODUCTION

THE DECLINE of United States strategic superiority over the Soviets and the early prospect of strategic parity (and possible United States inferiority) in some dimensions of nuclear power has raised obvious questions: Will parity/superiority dominate Soviet behavior in the seventies, or are there factors that will prove more weighty? More specifically, will parity tempt the Russians to a more expansionist, adventurous role? Will it conceivably lead to a lessened preoccupation with Western hostility? Will it or other considerations primarily affect her relations with her own bloc, with Red China, and with the Third World?

The Report proceeds in the following manner.

Part I reviews and attempts to clarify a few general features of Soviet behavior that bear on the problem of interpreting Soviet behavior in the past and attempting to forecast it in the future.

Part II then examines the historical record for light that it might throw on the way past Soviet behavior has responded to changes in her military and in her overall strategic situation. Although past behavior does not necessarily predict future tendencies, it might provide clues that we should not neglect.

Part III examines, in the light of this past behavior and given Soviet attainment of nuclear parity, how the context of the seventies -- especially the growth of Communist Chinese power -- will shape Soviet objectives and plans.

PART I

UNDER CONDITIONS of highly imperfect information, interpretation of Soviet behavior risks an overzealous attempt to assign specific and individual motives to each Soviet act that catches our attention or provokes our concern. When, in January 1971, Prime Minister Edward Heath met in Singapore with the Commonwealth political leaders to argue the necessity of selling weapons to South Africa in order to safeguard sea routes against Soviet naval control, a Soviet flotilla obliged the Prime Minister by sailing through the Strait of Malacca under the windows of the conference room. The multiple interpretations of this Soviet act included the ingenious ascription to the Soviets of an intent to assist the Prime Minister's case in order to prevent him from surrendering to Commonwealth objections, and thereby to insure continuation of a British and Commonwealth conflict of views.

Interpretations of this nature suffer from at least two possible deficiencies -- they provide highly individual interpretations for each separate Soviet act and they assign a conscious intent at high Soviet levels to acts which in many cases are probably the result of low-level bureaucratic preferences or convenience. Similar tendencies exist in the interpretation of acts of a more significant character than the one cited above. These interpretations neglect an orientation that can give to the analysis of Soviet acts a greater unity and perhaps a greater realism than it might otherwise have, an orientation that derives from a comparison of United States and Soviet conceptions of power.

Power and the Power Struggle:
United States and the Soviet Union Compared

Power is the ability to influence the behavior of foreign governments, élites, and masses in accordance with the requirements of policy. This formulation by itself almost suffices to explain why power as an objective has been viewed diffidently or negatively in the United States. Power implied intervention in the affairs of other nations and possibly aggrandizement. Power was sought by the "power hungry" "for its own sake." It was seen as characteristic of states where democracy had not taught the satisfactions of national domesticity. Power seemed irrelevant to the American goal of being "let alone" to pursue the American way of life.

Two world wars and the shadow of a third altered American views. It became evident that to be "let alone" it is sometimes necessary not to let others alone. American recognition of the need to establish positions of power was stimulated and rendered morally acceptable by specific threats against the United States and by the defensive requirements of deterrence or of fighting possible wars initiated by the Communist bloc. U.S. power is thus a power improvised against specific, perceived dangers. In such circumstances, the exercise of power is greatly influenced by its immediate, instrumental origin. The appreciation and uses of power are not easily learned when power is acquired for specific defensive objectives. De Gaulle's insistence on trying to reestablish the position of France as a major power after World War II was viewed in the United States as compounded of romanticism and wounded pride and not as a proper objective of responsible political leadership.

A characteristic interpretation of the postwar years was: "In the years following the second World War, America and Russia found themselves locked in a power conflict." Russia was indeed engaged in a struggle for power, but the United States was engaged in a struggle for security. This is a great difference, and the difference remains even if the overall objective of Soviet power was to maximize security. For the security attained by trying to ward off more-or-less specific threats is different from that attained by a position of power

uncircumscribed by limited, defensive objectives. The political exploitation of United States military power and its other resources, not in order to defend against specific vulnerabilities, but simply to increase the United States capacity to be an arbiter of world affairs, was only occasionally, hesitantly, and reluctantly pursued. Probably it was not seriously pursued because this seemed to be an objective in excess of the requirements of national security and clashed with United States moral sentiments and political experience in world affairs.

Interpretations of the Soviet attitude toward power, while stressing that the Soviets have different objectives from us, often attribute to them the same specificity accorded to our own actions. Where our actions are interpretable in terms of a variety of defensive goals and concerns, so Soviet actions are interpreted in terms of a variety of offensive or aggressive intents and interests.

There is another way of viewing attempts to increase national power.

Power may be pursued, not for specific ends now foreseen, but precisely because the contingencies of international life cannot in fact be anticipated. Uncertainties regarding the future, *including uncertainties concerning one's own future objectives*, make desirable increased room for maneuver, a greater number of options, and an increased ability to exercise control over the international environment. The unpredictability of future contingencies and goals, even more than the existence of known, specific goals, requires an instrument (power) of the most general applicability. Only when power is viewed as being such an important general asset that increments of it are sought *without regard to any specific and foreseeable use to which they may be put*, is a nation most fully committed to a "power struggle." It is in this sense that the United States has been less fully engaged than the Soviet Union in a power conflict.

Individuals and countries that pursue power, not only for presently known objectives but because power is a fund that facilitates action for future unknown circumstances and goals, give the impression of being "power hungry," of pursuing power "for its own sake." Although the pursuit of "power for its own sake" may occur in some cases, European (and

not just Soviet) statesmanship has generally understood that the pursuit of power was hardly to be confined to circumstances in which it could be defended as being instrumental to a specific objective. Indeed it was feared that if one waited to acquire power until its particular need became apparent, power would very likely elude one.

Power can be sought much in the same way as wealth is sought. Some people seek wealth to acquire particular objects. But generally the advantage of acquiring money is precisely its generalized, stockpiled purchasing power for eventualities and objects that may not now be envisaged or may not now even be imaginable. One is not supposed to view wealth as a "good in itself," but it is precisely the considerable range of action and choice that wealth permits that leads it to be *experienced* as a good in itself, that is, as something sought without regard to specific purchases in mind. Similarly power may be experienced as "power for its own sake" when it is stockpiled for unknown contingencies rather than for known ends. But being "power hungry" may not be any less rational than preferring a larger to a smaller bank balance.

The United States tends to act in relation to power somewhat in the manner of a person who saves money only when a specific purchase is in view. The Soviets, on the other hand, do not seem to think it wise to make the pursuit of power contingent on the perception of particular goals or specific perceived threats.

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, Soviet attempts to extend their military-political power can be interpreted as having a very general contingency aim in the sense described above and not, or not only, specific objectives or goals whose nature we may or may not correctly guess. Our examination of past Soviet behavior (Part II) in its relation to the strategic balance and the forecasting of probable future Soviet behavior under strategic parity (Part III) will be facilitated if we keep this alternative view of power in mind. We may then find that a great variety of Soviet acts make quite good sense, even though we do not or cannot attach a more specific objective to them other than to ensure increased freedom of action, that is, increased power.

One can, of course, suppose that deterrence and the ability to wage war is the real substance of "the power struggle," which is, otherwise, just a vague phrase. That this is not necessarily the case is suggested by the following consideration: United States aims with respect to deterrence and war-fighting capabilities could be fully met without precluding the disappearance of the United States as anything except a geographical expression.

Large amounts of power, like large financial resources, raise evident questions about possible geometric growth rates and about uses to which these resources are put as they reach various levels. Nor does the interpretation of political behavior as the accumulation of power for unknown contingencies, that is, as insurance, provide the answer to important additional questions: why particular acts or means are viewed as enhancing power; how decisions are reached as to which of alternative lines of conduct will provide the greater return; and whether these choices turn out to be correct.

The analogy between the acquisition of wealth and the pursuit of power can be usefully supplemented by a second analogy. Two masters trying to defeat each other in a chess game are, during a large part of the game, likely to be making moves that have no immediate end other than to "improve my position." One does not win a chess game by always selecting moves that are directly aimed at trying to mate the opponent or even at trying to win a particular piece. For the most part, the aim of a move is to find positions for one's pieces that (a) increase their mobility, that is, increase the options open to them and decrease the freedom of operation of the opponent's pieces; and (b) impose certain relatively stable patterns on the board that induce enduring strength for oneself and enduring weaknesses for the opponent. If and when sufficient positional advantages have been accumulated, they generally can be cashed in with greater or less ease by tactical maneuvers (combinations) against specific targets that are now no longer defensible or only at terrible cost. In chess there are players whose talents lean more in the direction of positional jockeying and others who have extraordinary genius in finding surprising combinations in what seems to be the most innocent circumstances. But whether a player

keeps developing a more and more crushing position (until "the game wins itself")* or uses a small positional advantage (or creates great complications in which he will outplay his opponent) to devise an immediate combination, the general distinction above still holds. The evaluation of the intent of a chess move -- is it a positional finesse or the first move of a hidden combination? -- is not a trivial judgment in chess. (The distinction, of course, is not always that sharp.)

To get back to the Soviet Union: It is desirable to try to distinguish between positional moves (he is improving his position, increasing his options, gaining room for maneuver, limiting my moves) and those moves that have the marks of being the first stage of a combination that is leading up to a specific dénouement. In chess it is fairly clear what the strategy of the "accumulation of small advantages" (Steinitz) is intended to lead to -- annihilation of the opponent. In real life the answer will not be that clear.

Strategic Position, Strategic Balance

In investigating the relation of Soviet behavior to her "strategic position" or to the US-SU "strategic balance," we need to clarify what these terms mean in the present context. Clearly they refer to aspects of Soviet and U.S. military capabilities, but which aspects we choose to include is a matter of our interests and analytic requirements. Present-day concern over impending parity suggests a definition that emphasizes the number of nuclear warheads and vehicles in Soviet and U.S. strategic force arsenals and attributes of force effectiveness

* That the "game wins itself" may seem an exaggerated statement, given the concentrated intellectual input required. But the statement is often truer than one might suppose if one takes into account that most of the concentrated effort goes into positional improvements and that after these have been accumulated the next moves suggest themselves almost effortlessly (sometimes!). In their political-military behavior the Soviets seem to have a well-developed sense of the utility of "improving their position" without worrying about what the follow-up will be. Their attitude seems analogous to the belief expressed in "Take care of the pennies and the dollars will take care of themselves."

such as accuracy, survivability, command and control. It is perfectly reasonable to ask whether changes in the strategic balance so conceived (narrow definition) are related to Soviet behavior and in what ways, provided the question does not imply that these particular aspects of U.S. and S.U. military power are assumed without further question to be the sole or principal determinants of Soviet behavior.

The conception of a country's strategic position can be broadened to include deterrence as well as war fighting capabilities, and general purpose and theater forces as well as strategic nuclear forces. This still emphasizes military forces (intermediate definition). The conception of strategic position can be further broadened to include political-military factors such as the acquisition or loss of allies, alliance morale and one's own national morale, willingness and ability to employ (or not to employ) nuclear diplomacy, political initiative, manpower and other geopolitical factors (broad definition).

The relation of Soviet behavior to the strategic balance when the latter is conceived in these different ways is likely to be different. Since we are concerned with the effects of nuclear parity on Soviet behavior in the seventies, it will be useful in Part II to examine the relation of past Soviet behavior to the nuclear balance (narrowly defined). But Soviet behavior in the future will be sensitive to other factors as well, and we shall also examine past Soviet behavior in relation to a strategic balance very broadly defined.

Our assumptions concerning the nuclear balance (narrow definition) in the period 1946-1971 are as follows. We take the years 1963-1964 as being the point at which United States strategic superiority began to decline, reaching parity in 1971-1972. The period immediately following World War II is more difficult to interpret. It is, of course, easy to interpret if one attaches no importance to the absolute size of nuclear forces and considers only ratios. We can then give the United States in 1946-1948 an "infinitely" great superiority (zero denominator) which declines sharply in 1949-1950. If, however, one supposes that in the earliest years the small absolute size of a force is relevant in judging strategic power, then the magnitude of U.S. superiority is reduced. In either case U.S. superiority in

intercontinental strategic war in the early postwar years is substantial. We assume that the strategic balance in favor of the United States remained roughly at a constant level during the fifties, increased more in favor of the United States in the early sixties, after which it steadily declined. Whether this gross characterization of the strategic balance (narrow definition) is adequate can only be determined later when we attempt to relate Soviet behavior to changes in it.

We assume (in the narrow definition) that top Soviet leaders had correct intelligence estimates throughout the period^{*} and that they largely assumed that top U.S. leaders also had correct estimates. First, a major part of strategic strength during the years when uncertainty about the missile situation may have existed was the bomber force of each side, concerning which there was much less mystery. Secondly, President Eisenhower repeatedly made statements indicating that the missile gap did not exist. Thirdly, although President Kennedy in 1960 and early in 1961 appeared to accept the existence of a missile gap, this view did not survive the summer of 1961, and in September 1961 Deputy Secretary Gilpatric made a statement that marked the end of the missile gap myth. There may, then, have been a period of almost a year when the Soviets believed that the United States thought it was deficient in missiles (although not necessarily in total strategic nuclear capabilities).

We assume that many Third World leaders and leaders in Western countries accepted Soviet statements of its strategic superiority over the United States. We assume also, of course, that the Soviet leaders were aware of the acceptance of this view.

* Stalin is alleged to have discounted the significance of the nuclear bomb. That he did not do so is suggested by the haste with which the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East two days after Hiroshima although she had earlier told the allies that she would not do so until a Sino-Soviet treaty had been concluded. Soviet all-out efforts, immediately following the war, to obtain a nuclear capability confirm the impression made by the immediate Soviet reaction to Hiroshima. Besides, the Soviets had organized a "Special Committee for the Problem of Uranium" as early as the spring of 1940. Its work was interrupted by the war, but revived in 1943 after the victory at Stalingrad.

Before leaving these clarifications concerning "relative strategic position" let us note one aspect of the current use of the term "strategic" in its application to military affairs. Increasingly, "strategic" has come to refer to a class of weapons (nuclear) and the personnel and vehicles associated with them (for example, strategic forces versus general purpose forces). "Strategic forces" are pre-eminently forces meant for use against the Soviet ZI, that is, for use in all-out nuclear war. (This has been modified to some extent by the use of the B-52 in Vietnam but the distinction largely holds.) The use of "strategic" to distinguish particular (nuclear) forces (and consequently types of operations or wars) contrasts with its traditional use to distinguish between "strategy" and "tactics." Strategy, as a plan of sequential action prescribing disposition, supply, movement, and objectives of large-scale forces as a function of corresponding enemy dispositions, embraced the operation of all sorts and levels of forces and units. Tactics, as the rules for maneuver of units in the presence of the enemy, emphasizes, it is true, smaller units, but strategy or the strategic plan did not exclude these units.

The identification of "strategic" with "strategic forces" (nuclear forces) tends to substitute strategic (nuclear) force planning for considerations of total strategy in the older sense. *Discussions of "the strategic situation" and the "strategic environment" tend to become increasingly discussions of force postures. There is thus a danger that one may have lots of strategic forces but relatively little strategy.*

The point of the foregoing is to suggest that the narrowing of vision implied by U.S. terminology runs the danger of attributing a similar view to the Soviets. The Soviets no doubt have a major interest in obtaining parity or superiority, but parity for them will mean a *reevaluation* of the strategic situation rather than in itself being *equated with* the strategic situation. This reevaluation is very likely to embrace the "strategic situation" in the broadest sense. It will, for example, certainly include the increasing threat posed by China. It is just because we believe that the Soviet view of the "strategic situation" embraces China and other concerns (and not by any means

simply the balance of nuclear might) that Soviet attainment of nuclear parity/superiority will not loom as large in our later analysis of the seventies as some readers might expect.

Dimensions of Soviet Behavior

In relating Soviet behavior to changes in her relative strategic position, we need some guidelines to distinguish the areas of Soviet conduct that may reveal such relationships.

Naturally, the loss of United States superiority, together with the experience of past Soviet behavior, increases apprehension concerning Soviet "aggressiveness," "expansionism," "adventurism," "threats," "forward strategy," "interventions," "blackmail," "confrontations." It also raises the possibility that increased military power will increase the Soviet sense of security and this will make the Soviet Union more "conciliatory," "relaxed," "defensive," or "cooperative."

What, more specifically, do such terms mean? And is it self-evident whether a Soviet act is aggressive or defensive? Hostile or conciliatory? Expansionist or status quo? Cautious or risky? Was, for example, the Soviet withdrawal from Austria (Austrian peace treaty, May 1955) a "conciliatory" move or an "aggressive" effort to tempt West Germany to defect from NATO? And if the latter, was this to facilitate the defense of Soviet borders or to provide options for attack or the threat of attack on Western Europe?

We shall try to deal with these issues more specifically as they arise. Here we simply note that terms like "aggressive" and "defensive," "hostile" and "conciliatory," "expansionist" and "defensive" cannot be assumed to be mutually exclusive. It is possible to attack in order to defend,* and one can engage in acts that simultaneously

*When X attacks on the supposition that he is going to be attacked by Y, the situation will vary greatly according to how correct the supposition was and how distant in time (and therefore how uncertain) Y's attack is supposed to occur. The Soviets have sometimes behaved as if the sheer existence of "an imperialist power" is equivalent to a certain attack by it. Consequently, any Soviet *initiative* is viewed as really

facilitate expansion and defense. In fact, we shall observe a Soviet tendency to believe that offense is the best defense.

From the standpoint of the United States and the Western powers, it is small comfort to see a country swallowed up or reduced to dependency on the Russians because the Soviet motive is defensive or simultaneously defensive and aggressive. Indeed, if we view a series of critical cases, we begin to perceive that in describing them what becomes important is not simply whether the Soviet motive is defensive or offensive, or both, but whether or not the Soviets undertake acts that they have every reason to believe will alarm us or will increase our hostility. The Soviet willingness to alienate us or to alarm us, to risk an increased military effort on our part or some other form of retaliation is an aspect of Soviet behavior that has its analogue in personal relations. He who knowingly acts in a way that will offend us and provoke us is viewed as unfriendly or hostile. We may, of course, be overly sensitive and demanding, in which case it may be recognized that the pursuit of his legitimate rights necessitates that he be unfriendly. In effect, then, it is not only his motive that makes us view an act as aggressive or not, but also what he expects our reaction will be and what his regard or disregard for that reaction is. The Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba may have been a defensive move (increase deterrence), but Soviet awareness of the seriousness with which this would be interpreted by the United States made the Soviet act appear highly aggressive to the United States and probably to the Soviets as well. Similarly, the Berlin Wall may have been purely defensive (that is, to prevent East German flights to West Berlin) but Soviet awareness of the probable nature of Western reactions to the Berlin Wall led most of the parties and observers to perceive this act as aggressive and hostile.

The degree to which an act is "legal" or acceptable in international practice is likely to affect one or the other party's view of

a *reaction* to the pre-existing imperialist intention to attack (see, for example, the quotation from Zhdanov's "two-camp" declaration, p. 25 below).

it. The Berlin Wall was a violation of the Potsdam agreements. Expansion of Soviet aid, trade, and cultural relations may be equally alarming to the United States, but Soviet attitudes toward our alarm and their willingness to be inhibited by it will be affected by the acceptable or "legitimate" character of these activities.

Evidently, whether a Soviet act is viewed as aggressive or hostile in these various senses is related to our and their judgments on how and to what extent it affects United States (Western) security. To what extent does it "improve the Soviet position" or deteriorate our own position? Or to what extent is it the first move or part of a "combination"? A Soviet act that we believe worsens our security position is likely to be interpreted by us as hostile.

There are several different areas of Soviet behavior that can provide clues to Soviet reactions to changes in her strategic situation.

During the years of the Comintern and the Cominform, there existed "political lines" intended to direct communist parties in their relations with the world, with other communist parties, and with competing socialist and radical political groups, and to provide correct interpretations of current realities and the task of the revolutionary. These political lines are generally distinguished according to whether they were "hard" or "soft." Hard lines rejected collaboration with other left groups and, in the Third World or colonial areas, with bourgeois anti-imperialist political parties and formations. Soft lines tolerated collaboration and also on occasion encouraged united fronts with Western noncommunist, nonsocialist groups. Closely related to the political line are the direction and support of local communist parties and of various activities involving the internal political life of the noncommunist powers.

A second area of Soviet behavior, of increasing importance after World War II, is her activity and policy in the Third World. This overlaps a great deal with the first area.

A third area is Soviet government-to-government relations and confrontations with the developed, industrial states, more especially the Western governments. The second and third areas also overlap since

Soviet-Western confrontations often took place in Third World settings.

A fourth dimension of Soviet behavior that may be related to and affected by the strategic balance is her behavior (a) domestically, (b) toward the Soviet bloc, and (c) toward former bloc countries (China, Albania, Yugoslavia).

Finally, we should note, before leaving these preliminary observations, that Soviet behavior means -- whether or not we can always distinguish them -- the behavior not only of the principal leaders and the Politburo but also that of other relevant actors on the Soviet scene -- the military and civilian bureaucracies and various sectors of the Soviet population.

PART II

The Prewar Period

IN 1919 MIKHAIL BORODIN arrived in Mexico to organize communist activities and to make Mexico a center for communist action in the Latin American world. Two points are of interest. First, this occurred in the United States "backyard," that is, in an area that could be presumed to increase considerably United States sensitivity to Bolshevik activity. Secondly, a principal motive for organizing these activities and establishing relations with the Mexican government was to distract the United States from intervention against the Soviet Union. Thus, a motive of defense led, not to an attempt to placate the United States or to render its anxieties concerning Bolshevism less acute, but rather to an act that the United States was bound to interpret as hostile and aggressive. This choice of an aggressive rather than a conciliatory policy was probably related both to Bolshevik convictions concerning the relative effectiveness in general of the former over the latter as a political tactic and to their image of the imperialist powers as implacably opposed to the Soviet Union and to communism and as incapable of conciliation.

At the same time as Borodin was busy in Mexico, Bukharin expressed with respect to Africa ("even the Hottentots and Bushmen") the same principle, namely, that Soviet action did not hope to establish communist states in these areas in the near future, but was intended to weaken the imperialist powers. Some of these goals had military overtones. Thus the Russians showed a particular interest in developing communist movements in Argentina and Uruguay because these countries were major

providers of food for Great Britain. The ability to disrupt this source of food was viewed as possibly hindering military action against the Soviet Union.

These immediate and "practical" motives for Soviet action were reinforced by a variety of ideological and strategic considerations. Until the doctrine of "socialism in one country" prevailed and opposition to it declared a Trotskyist heresy, the Soviet Union was thought not to be viable unless other countries followed in its footsteps. The other countries most involved in this consideration were not the colonial or poorer countries now known as the Third World. Still, they were viewed as an important source of imperialist strength, and to trouble imperial rule in these lands increased revolutionary possibilities in the capitalist states. After "socialism in one country" prevailed, the spread of communism remained a communist duty, but its purpose was not so much to establish new communist states as to support the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, that is, to enhance its security. Revolutionary failures in Germany and Hungary and the Russian defeat in 1920 before Warsaw had in any case already dimmed expectations of early communist expansion. In Third World areas, however, an occasional optimism associated with ultra-leftism marked several attempts to seize power, for example, in El Salvador (1932) and in Brazil (1935). In 1924 the Soviets forced Peking, by then under Kuomintang control, to recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and a year later sponsored there a People's Republic which was later included in the Soviet Five-Year Plan. Whether the Soviets aspired, during the Spanish Civil War, to set up a Soviet republic in Spain seems not to be agreed on by the specialists. In any event, new communist states did not develop until after World War II.

The ability of the Russians to engage in either disruptive or outright revolutionary activity in the Third World was facilitated by the Comintern, founded in 1919 in the midst of the Civil War. Comintern activities marked the Soviet inclination to view all parts of the world as so many dioceses providing either political opportunities or presenting potential threats. The organization of communist parties and the

direction and subsidization of their activities required no immediate success for their justification. What was wanted was that these instruments -- not always reliable or submissive -- be available when opportunities presented themselves or when necessity required their use. The Communist Parties of Chile and Cuba were organized in 1922 and 1925, long before they achieved important positions of power. Although to the Western states the Comintern was an aggressive, hostile organization, Soviet policy as formulated by Lenin in 1920 at the Second Comintern Congress favored collaboration with the "national bourgeoisies" in pursuit of liberation from imperialism. This cooperative policy was opposed by the Indian communist, M. N. Roy, and both his and Lenin's theses were adopted by the Comintern. Stalin followed the policy proposed by Lenin, but after the failure in China resulting from collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek, he switched in 1928 to a condemnation of every other left party and anti-imperialist political movement, a policy of seeking exclusive communist leadership that, despite a change in the mid-thirties, hastened the decline of Soviet and Comintern influence up to World War II.

Soviet revolutionary appeals to the proletariats and the colonial masses did not mean that the Soviet Union discounted the value of diplomatic relations. From quite early years^{*} to the present the Soviets have found both satisfaction and foreign and domestic utility in their formal acceptance by other nations and in the implied rebuke to the United States and to countries that refused to establish relations with them. Nor did revolutionary appeals preclude the pursuit of more conventional objectives of diplomatic relations. Although the Soviets early developed a taste for using diplomatic communications to carry on activities that other governments tend to leave to their propaganda offices, they showed a keen interest in agreements and treaties that improved their political and economic position. While not losing sight

* Right after the revolution the foreign relations of the Soviet Union were thought to be largely a matter of presiding over the world revolution. The Soviets expected, as Trotsky confessed, that as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, he would "issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop."

of the value of the Comintern, the Soviets found more important successes in diplomatic overtures. The Soviet-German accord at Rapallo in 1922, which brought together the two outlaws of European political life, was viewed both in and outside the Soviet Union as a major success. The importance of Rapallo for Russia is perhaps reflected in the persistence with which she viewed Germany, together with her own military preparations, as the mainstay (in Europe) of her security. Soviet efforts, while attempting to repair relations with France and Great Britain after 1934, to maintain correct relations with Germany, and the non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, are understandable in view of the options available to her. Nonetheless, Stalin may also have been loath to discard the judgment that the two outcasts of Europe were appropriate collaborators. Indeed the Nazi-Soviet pact permitted Stalin in 1939 and 1940 to incorporate eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Baltic, Bessarabia in the Balkans, and a small part of Finland (by force of arms) in the north, immediate gains that an alliance with the Western European powers would not have made so easy. Indeed, Stalin's war with Finland earned him his expulsion from the League of Nations.

By the end of 1924, almost all the major powers, except the United States, had recognized the Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations led the Soviet Union into a double game. On the one hand, through local communist parties and the Comintern, and through her diplomatic and trade services as well, the Soviet Union engaged in actions hostile to the regimes to whom her diplomats were, or sought to be, accredited. At the same time, she was busy cultivating these regimes. The conflict between these two objectives showed up when some countries, disillusioned by subversive and other hostile acts committed by local and foreign communists and by Soviet officials, broke off relations with the Soviet Union. The history of these incidents suggests that a somewhat more subtle behavior would have enabled the Russians to carry off both lines of their policy with even greater success. Nonetheless, the Soviets managed to maintain the fiction that the Comintern was not the Soviet Union and they did, in fact, sometimes pursue different lines. When the hard, revolutionary line after 1928 was instituted by the Comintern, Moscow's diplomacy pursued a less violent tack. While the

Comintern was preaching the "imminence of proletarian revolution" in Germany after Hitler came to power, Moscow avoided, prior to the onset of war in 1939, anything that the Nazis could interpret as a provocation by her. In 1935, however, when the Soviet Union became increasingly concerned with the Nazi threat and was pursuing an active diplomacy of rapprochement with the Western powers, the Soviets took care to make the Comintern line accord more with its diplomatic line. Popular Fronts with all anti-Fascist groups became the order of the day. Soviet residual attachment to the hard line was, however, reflected by her failure to repudiate the 1928 Comintern doctrine.

Interpretations

This brief review of the prewar period suggests the following conclusions:

1. Soviet forward strategy in the Third World is not the product of the Khrushchev era and Soviet nuclear successes. Soviet interest and activity in the Third World existed from the earliest years of the regime, although the diversity of her later relations with Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East overshadow those of the prewar years. Her prewar aims in the Third World were supported by a smaller range of instruments than later became available, although even the development of Soviet aid to the Third World from the mid-fifties on had its early anticipations in treaties with countries bordering on Russia -- with Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Mongolia, as early as 1921, and with China in 1924.

2. Soviet prewar foreign policy showed oscillations that do not seem to bear consistent relations to the strategic situation and to the fear of war.

(a) In 1918 the Bolsheviks responded to the dangers of civil war and military intervention by the West* by aggressive action

* In fact, the initial intervention by foreign troops was made by Japan in Vladivostok in 1918.

in colonial areas, in independent, less developed states such as those of Latin America, and by revolutionary appeals in Europe and Asia.

(b) In 1920 the political (Comintern) line changed and until 1928 a soft or collaborative line was pursued in the Third World with bourgeois and other anti-imperialist groups. This meant a slightly more "correct" behavior vis-à-vis the Western powers. Most of this period coincided with the relative safety of the post-Rapallo years. This might suggest, consistent with the indication of the period 1918-1920 when Soviet aggressive action coincided with a period of great danger, that the soft line coincided with increased security. Unfortunately, this neat relationship between strategic position and political line breaks down under closer inspection. The soft line had, after all, been introduced two years earlier than Rapallo, in 1920, and was ended by Stalin after the break with Chiang Kai-shek, indicating that political experiences and judgments rather than changes in the strategic situation played the major role in shaping policy changes.

(c) The return of a hard, inflexible line between 1928 and 1934 coincided with a period of gradually increasing danger in Europe which once again suggests that increasing threat and insecurity provoke an aggressive, hostile political line. But again, this interpretation has to be discounted because, as we have just seen, the actual change to the new line was related more to events in the Far East than to those in Europe whose meaning, in any case, does not seem to have become fully clear to Stalin until about 1934.

(d) In the subsequent years (1934 on) the return, during a period of greatly increased insecurity, to united front, collaborative tactics, and the diplomatic courting of the democratic powers reflected Soviet recognition, finally, that the democracies, the League of Nations, and the "social fascists" might be a support against the gathering Nazi storm (and Japanese threats in the East). The Comintern soft line, however, was not as flexible as

Soviet diplomacy. In this period, then, the soft line seems clearly motivated by the threat of war, the danger of isolation, and a sense of vulnerability.

(e) And yet during a period of imminent danger, with war in the West already under way, in November 1940, Molotov made demands on Berlin with respect to the Baltic, Eastern Europe, and Finland, demands that angered Hitler and reaffirmed his decision to attack the Soviet Union. Although these demands can be viewed as motivated by defense considerations, they also have the air of coming from a fellow brigand who wants his cut. Stalin was apparently prepared to tread very dangerous ground where territorial gains and areas of influence were involved, and perhaps especially so because of the Nazi failure in the Battle for Britain.

In brief, then, it is only in the two short periods 1918-1920 and 1934-1939 that there seems to be a relatively consistent relation between the Soviet strategic situation and her political and diplomatic behavior. And in these two cases the relation is contradictory, weakness associated with aggressiveness in the first period and weakness associated with a collaborative line in the second case. The second case is then further complicated by Soviet behavior vis-à-vis Hitler in late 1940. Soviet failure to respond in as aggressive a fashion in the 1934-1939 period of weakness as it did during the first critical years of the revolution may be attributed in part to the fact that in the late thirties (as compared with 1918-1920) she was able to find some common interests with the democracies, whereas in 1918-1920 the entire capitalist world was assumed to be beneficiaries of her defeat.

3. Soviet prewar soft lines were soft only relative to their hard lines. From the standpoint of Western governments the Comintern and much of Soviet diplomacy were unyielding, aggressive, and hostile. Viewed in this light, Soviet behavior went through fewer changes than the fanfare of Comintern congresses might suggest. Despite variations, Soviet behavior through the period 1917-1939 can be described as aggressive-defensive, that is to say that aggressiveness serves both to provide gains and at the same time to ward off the dangers of weakness. Since the Soviet strategic situation throughout the period

1917-1939 was, despite its ups and downs, in general that of a technically backward nation faced by powers stronger than and hostile to her, it appears that there was a coincidence of strategic inferiority with a generally aggressive-defensive form of behavior. If, however, one emphasizes those variations in her strategic situation and in her behavior (point 2 above) that occurred within this general tendency, it appears that military threats in the late thirties had more effect in dampening Soviet aggressive political behavior than such threats had in 1918-1920. Diplomatic behavior in the late thirties showed a clearer tendency to seek accommodation and collaboration with Great Britain and France than did Soviet action in the mass political field.

4. From the earliest days of the regime the Bolsheviks recognized the relation of their foreign policy objectives to their military or strategic situation. Their military weakness, the fragility of a communist regime surrounded by capitalist nations, required world revolution or at least political agitation as a countermeasure. Just how much Soviet survival was in fact due to revolutionary disorders, to her propaganda effort, and to her ability to encourage discord among the Allies is difficult to say. But it seems clear that the early years and also subsequent experiences gave the Bolsheviks evidence that political initiative and the advantages of being the defender of the dispossessed and the impoverished could compensate at least in part for military weakness and permit counteroffensives against the capitalist powers. The Soviets probably did not lose sight of the fact that the disinclination of the Allied interventionist forces in Russia to fight was a military victory gained by political and psychological measures and circumstances.* And if revolutionary appeals and outbreaks in Europe did not lead to full-scale revolutions, the Soviets on the other hand could view the political effect of their impact on the intellectual

* Another lesson on the importance of political factors for military success was learned by the Russians not from one of their successes but from one of their failures. In 1920-1921, when the Soviet Union had to fight the Poles under Pilsudski, they had thought that revolutionary appeals would bring the Polish troops to their side. But they discovered that Polish nationalism and Polish traditional hatred of Russia were stronger than the battle cry of the international proletariat.

and political life of the West and the East with considerable satisfaction.

5. The Soviets were not inclined to rely in the pre-World War II years solely on alliances and nonaggression pacts or on mass political action to increase their security. The primary effort went, of course, into the buildup of their own armed forces. Soviet military spending (in constant 1937 prices) increased from about 2 billion rubles in 1928, to 17 billion in 1937, and to 46 billion in 1940 (that is, from 1.3 percent of GNP in 1928, to 8 percent in 1937, and 17 percent in 1940). It seems reasonably clear that this massive infusion of funds in the late thirties served largely defensive ends, but it may have given the Soviets the confidence to move more fully into the Baltic and East Europe after the Nazi-Soviet pact.

6. What would have happened had the Soviets felt themselves safe from attack or had felt that their strategic position was strong? Perhaps in the early years they might have husbanded more fully their slender resources, but even without the threat of encirclement and military inferiority, ideological impulses and longer-range strategic insurance (safety now is no guarantee of future safety in a world most of which is beyond Soviet control) combined with great-power ambitions would very likely by themselves have prompted much the same general line of action that immediate apprehensions dictated.

The Postwar Period

The end of World War II had some similarity to the situation that obtained in the first years of the regime. Once again the USSR was a war-ravaged country in a world of imperialist powers (one of whom possessed the atom bomb) and whose recent status as allies was no recommendation given the defeat of the common enemy that had inspired their collaboration. "Even now, after the greatest victory known to history, we cannot for one minute forget the basic fact that our country remains the one socialist state in the world" (Kalinin, August 1945), a situation that was rapidly remedied by the Soviets during the next three years.

Just as the Comintern began its career after World War I, so the Cominform began its career in 1947, although the inclusion of only two Western communist parties (France and Italy) in its organizational meeting indicated a major concern with a new political entity -- the Soviet satellite. Perhaps some uncertainty existed in Stalin's mind initially about the appropriate postwar political line, but by 1947 the "two-camp thesis" had been developed and the imperialist powers, now led by the United States, were viewed, as in 1917, as the implacable foes of the Soviet Union. Cooperation with bourgeois nationalist elements was rejected and in colonial or Third World areas the strategy of armed revolt became more appealing. Soviet fear that conciliation and passivity would increase the dangers arising from one's own weakness was expressed by Andrei Zhdanov in his 1947 "two-camp" declaration: "Concessions to the new course of the United States and the imperialist camp may encourage its inspirers to be even more insolent and aggressive. The Communist Parties must *therefore* [emphasis added]... ." Apparently, then, what the communist parties must do is not simply win victories desirable in themselves, but victories that will discourage attacks on the Soviet Union.

This Soviet political line was foreshadowed by Soviet preoccupation with the opportunities afforded by postwar settlements. Already in December 1941, with the war barely begun, Stalin was insisting to Eden on recognition of the territorial gains made in the September 1939-June 1941 period, resulting from the deal with Hitler. Soviet unwillingness to get out of Iran after the war, her violations in Eastern Europe of the Yalta agreement ("an iron curtain has descended," Churchill, March 1946), her pressure on Turkey, the support of communist guerrilla action in Greece by her satellites (Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria), the addition of Czechoslovakia to her satellites by a communist coup in February 1948, and the blockade of Berlin in June 1948 were accompanied in the East by attempted, but unsuccessful, revolts in India, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. Soviet involvement in these more distant areas, where her opportunities for control and intervention were much more limited, varied considerably.

However, Zhdanov's 1947 "two-camp" speech received, three months later, a supplement in the form of an influential article by E. Zhukov which applied Zhdanov's theses to the East. Attempts to stimulate the communist parties of both West and East to energetic action were given in the East a more substantial form through the Southeast Asian Youth Conference in Calcutta in February 1948 where Yugoslavia played an important role and where the Zhdanov speech "penetrated all discussion." Soviet interest in pressing for communist action in the East was aimed more against the imperialist powers than against local bourgeois regimes, a discrimination that Eastern communist parties were less inclined to make. In Latin America, where Soviet representation and political instruments were available, crude Soviet measures led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations and to attacks on communist parties by a number of the Latin states. These failures in the Third World produced second thoughts about a policy that had alienated many Third World elements without achieving its objectives. However, this recognition did not lead to implementation of a new policy until after Stalin's death.

It is apparent, then, that following the pattern established after World War I, Soviet (nuclear and air) inferiority to the United States did not discourage aggressive action. As after World War I, a possibility of major upheavals throughout the world, especially in the colonial countries, suggested opportunities for enhancing Soviet security and extending its field of control, opportunities that in Eastern and Central Europe were further enhanced by a Soviet military presence.

The Soviet atom bomb test in August 1949 and the final victory of the Chinese Communists in the same year may have provided some encouragement for Soviet support for the invasion of South Korea, but much of the Soviet "forward policy" that marked the early Cold War period had occurred before these events. Earlier Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and Berlin, particularly sensitive areas given their European locus, had not waited upon a Soviet ability to demonstrate its nuclear competence.

The Soviet H-bomb test in 1953, one year after that of the United States, was followed by Soviet use of nuclear threats in an effort to

intimidate the NATO powers, an effort further supported by the buildup of Soviet conventional forces. In the Third World, however, 1953 and the years immediately following the death of Stalin were more notable for their shift from Stalin's hard line and aggressive attempts at armed insurrection to a policy of developing coalitions with bourgeois nationalist groups and of providing economic and military assistance. Her own satellites also benefited from this more relaxed posture through some decentralization of control. These were the years when Khrushchev and Bulganin made their initial tours to cultivate relations with the Third World and opened their aid offensive.

In 1956 the Soviet Union utilized nuclear threats in the course of her effort to take advantage of strong United States pressure to compel French and British withdrawal from their Suez Canal adventure. The nuclear threat against Britain and France provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to advertise her nuclear arsenal as an instrument useable on behalf of a country in which the Soviets had acquired a major political stake. This interest in Egypt was backed by the first peacetime Soviet sale of military equipment to a noncontiguous country (disguised, to be sure, as a sale by Czechoslovakia).

In August 1957 the Soviets began a series of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and also tested their intercontinental ballistic missile a year in advance of the United States. On October 4 they launched Sputnik. Four days later the Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb "of great power and new design." These various tests and Sputnik added greatly to Soviet capacity for nuclear diplomacy in the West and to her prestige among her clients and other states of the Third World. The successes of the Soviet Union were timely in that they wiped out in some measure the setbacks occasioned by her invasion of Hungary in 1956. They provided an aura of optimism -- at least in official circles -- for the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. The atmosphere of this communist celebration reflected confidence that history was in her favor (with only Mao raising a troubling note about those who "are continually fearing war").

Although Soviet space and nuclear accomplishments in 1956 impressed the world, they did not hinder the United States from acting during the

Lebanon crisis of 1958. The early fruits of Soviet ballistic missile development showed themselves in mid-1960 when the Soviet Union began to take Cuba under its wing and warned the United States that "it should be borne in mind that the United States is now not at such an inaccessible distance from the Soviet Union. . . . Figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillery men can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire. . . ." (Khrushchev) Still, U.S. involvement in the Bay of Pigs was hardly restrained by such declarations.

In 1960 the Congo crisis led to another Soviet reaction in the Third World arena, also without success -- the dispatching of 15 planes with Soviet technical personnel in support of Lumumba. Soviet efforts to overcome the barrier of distance were more successfully attacked in the spring of 1961 by Russia's first manned space shot, which added to prestige already acquired from Sputnik. In the late summer of that same year and in 1962 the Soviets shifted from strong reactions to events which they had not initiated to two major initiatives of their own -- Khrushchev's renewed ultimatum on behalf of a German peace treaty together with the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile venture.

After the failure in Cuba, the Soviets refrained in the following years from precipitating major confrontations with the West by acts of their own initiation. In the Pakistan-Indian conflict they played a pacifying role at Tashkent, and in the Chinese-Indian conflict coincident with Cuba they also tried to tread a delicate path between the two parties, although with some *parti pris* in favor of India. In Vietnam and the Middle East the Soviet Union opposed the United States, but both parties avoided a confrontation. Nuclear threats against the West declined after the exposure of the missile gap myth in 1961 and especially after Cuba. In general, Soviet action, even when aggressive, had less of the exuberance that characterized it under Khrushchev. Only in Syria and Egypt did Soviet action show some of its earlier vigor, but not enough to compel Israel to repeat the withdrawal that she, together with France and Great Britain, had made in 1956. Significantly enough, the Brezhnev Doctrine was a doctrine aimed at the Eastern European states and not at the West, and after Cuba it was not against capitalist states but against communist states that the most aggressive Soviet

actions, both involving military force, occurred -- the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the border conflicts of 1969 with Red China. The latter were accompanied by Soviet nuclear threats more vigorous by far than anything she had attempted against the Western powers.

Egypt (1956), the Congo (1960), and Cuba (1962) were primarily confrontations with the West. Although they had their locus in Third World countries, they did not reflect the range of Soviet activity in the Third World. The relatively soft line and the economic and military aid programs instituted by Khrushchev sought to avoid the disasters of Soviet hard-line policy in the Third World pursued in the post-war years under Stalin. Diplomatic, trade, and aid relations with Third World countries developed at a pace reflected in the number of treaties concluded with Third World countries -- 46 in 1954 and 1955, 70 in 1956 and 1957, 96 in 1958 and 1959, and 138 in 1960 and 1961. During the last five years Soviet (Aeroflot) international air routes more than doubled to about 100,000 miles and now reach sixty countries.

Soviet aid activities during the decade 1955-1965 reflected a belief in the possibility of developing Third World economies by an expansion of the public sector through expropriation and industrialization. Actually the failure of these countries to develop their economies efficiently did not initially trouble the Soviets greatly, provided their domestic and foreign policies served Soviet interests. However, by 1964 and 1965 the Russians were feeling the burden of their aid activities and began to question the ability of Third World bureaucracies and leaders to administer rapidly expanding public sectors. Earlier she had attempted to protect herself from too great an economic burden by avoiding long-term commitments and pursuing a policy of *ad hoc* aid where opportunities for quick political returns seemed virtually guaranteed. However, in Cuba, in Egypt, and in Indonesia she had gradually been drawn into resource commitments on a scale that she probably had not anticipated.

After some hesitation, in 1966 the Soviet Union, faced with the inability of major Third World debtors to pay their debts, began to stress economic efficiency rather than revolutionary zeal, performance

and results rather than expansion, and flexibility rather than central control. If necessary, the Soviet Union was willing to encourage private enterprise at the expense of the public sector. She was opposed to "ultra-revolutionary haste" and condemned bureaucracies in the Third World countries that tended to be more concerned with their own welfare than with the economic development of their countries. This increasing Soviet impatience with client states was, however, not entirely motivated by their economic performance. The losses of important positions of influence sustained by the overthrow of Sukarno, Ben Bella, and Nkrumah made economic costs less tolerable.

Soviet support of economic rationality and economic "liberalism" for the Third World did not mean any great increase in tolerance for political forces not sympathetic to the Soviet Union, although the Soviets had given up offering aid only to those countries considered nonaligned. She had, for example, provided aid (credits)* to countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Brazil that were frankly in the Western camp.

The Soviet Union's resistance to excessive ideological zeal that made support of her Third World clients more costly has suggested to some specialists that the Soviets did not want these countries to become communist states, provided of course that they were sympathetic to the Soviet Union and avoided undue familiarity with China. It has also been said that Algeria, Egypt, and Ghana served Soviet purposes better as they were than they would have as communist states, a view that the Soviets may share.

Together with her economic and military aid relations the Soviet Union increased her diplomatic relations with the Third World, especially in Latin America where U.S. influence had been eroded by the late sixties. Both here and elsewhere the Soviets have benefited from a Third World desire for contacts with both the Western and Eastern

* Soviet credits have largely meant the supply of commodities or services against repayment by the Third World countries in their export commodities, in effect, a barter system. Sometimes as in the case of Brazil, the Third World country had some difficulty in getting reimbursed for their exports because Soviet exports proposed to them were not suitable. In the last two years the Soviets have shown greater flexibility and have made a few purchases in Latin America with hard currencies.

blocs. In addition to diplomatic and aid relations, the Soviets increased, although not in any remarkable way,^{*} their trade relations with the Third World. This was an almost inevitable consequence of their aid activities since, in addition to their regular trade (mostly barter), most of Soviet economic aid was in the form of commercial credits on favorable interest and repayment terms.

Despite the growth of Soviet diplomatic, aid, and trade relations with the Third World, other activities have also emerged (or continued) which are less agreeable. Although the Soviets have generally in recent years frowned on guerrilla activity and armed revolt in areas such as Latin America where they are interested in consolidating relations with governments,^{**} in displacing the United States, and in limiting Chinese influence, they have maintained through their cultural, propaganda, and training activities in the Third World, in the Soviet Union, and in Eastern Europe, instruments flexible enough to serve the older purposes that distinguished the Comintern and the Cominform, purposes that rivalry with Red China or changes in the military and political environment of Soviet-Western relations may call once more into being. The last four years have seen a considerable extension of Soviet naval activity, not only in the Mediterranean but in the Indian Ocean and Caribbean where there have been substantial Soviet naval parades. The threat of Soviet nuclear weapons in the Caribbean has once again become real. Soviet military personnel have engaged in combat activity in Egypt and were active in an uncertain role in the Sudan. Not all Soviet actions in the Third World are directed toward that peaceful

^{*} Soviet trade with noncommunist Third World countries has increased modestly by \$500 million between 1969 and 1970. However, Soviet trade has been erratic and subject to wide fluctuations in particular countries and regions. The growth of trade with the Third World by all communist countries is more substantial and has grown more smoothly.

^{**} Louis Corvalán, general secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, now finds words like "revolution" too indelicate to use. "It is possible that in some countries the popular democratic forces will also come to power by means of elections. But it is obvious that in many other Latin American countries these forces will most likely gain power by *other means* [emphasis added]."

coexistence and competition of different economic and social systems that Khrushchev once proclaimed as the consequence of nuclear stalemate.

Interpretations

The Soviet postwar political line shows the same ambiguous relation to the strategic balance that we observed in the prewar period. The political line adopted during the postwar years (1946 to Stalin's death) was hard, dogmatic, and hostile, with little inclination to collaborate with other groups or to see virtue in their efforts to fight against imperialism. The hard line changed with Khrushchev and Bulganin, although its inadequacy was already recognized before Stalin's death. The line took an even more "liberal" change after about 1965-1966 (see above) accompanied by an increased reluctance, as in Latin America, to support the guerrilla activities and revolutionary theories of various left-wing groups. Thus the political line became progressively softer and if we put this side-by-side with the evolution of the strategic balance, we find that whereas change in the political line is unidirectional, the strategic balance (narrowly defined) gradually increases in the United States favor in the early sixties and then declines after 1963 and 1964. Thus changes in the strategic balance are not reflected by corresponding changes in the political line. Similarly, during a period when the strategic balance remained relatively constant, roughly the fifties, the political line was very different in the early part under Stalin as compared with the latter part of the period under Khrushchev.

If, instead of the general political line, we examine major Soviet political and military actions and reactions, we find a clearer relation between strategic balance and Soviet behavior. In 1946 to 1950 the Soviet Union brought pressure to bear on her periphery, and in Europe itself. During this period the strategic balance was enough in favor of the United States to show that Soviet initiative and risk-taking were not greatly inhibited by U.S. nuclear superiority. The Congo (1960), Berlin and the Berlin Wall (1961), and Cuba (1962), the last

two of which were Khrushchev's most aggressive initiatives, coincided with a time when the United States advantage in the strategic balance was approaching its peak.

After Khrushchev's fall and during the years 1965 to the present, when the Soviet Union was reducing U.S. strategic superiority, strong anti-West action was more limited -- some harassment in Berlin (April 1965), her rearmament of Egypt and the committing of combat personnel there, her support for the Vietnamese Communist Party, her extensive naval operations in Third World areas -- none of which involved confrontations as critical as those that took place at a time when her strategic position had not yet improved.

It appears, then, that Soviet attempts to impose her will or to control the course of events not initiated by herself were more vigorous and of a more risky character during the years of greatest strategic inferiority (in the narrow sense) than during the more recent period in which she has been rapidly approaching strategic equality. This postwar negative correlation between Soviet aggressiveness and improvement in her strategic position may be a causal relation -- that is, inferiority and its perception produce an aggressive reaction to ward off the dangers of weakness. More specifically in the case of Cuba (1962) aggressive action may have been intended to provide a quick and cheap way of overcoming strategic inferiority.

On the other hand, increased Soviet naval activity and Soviet military action in Egypt and Africa might, given the less flamboyant Brezhnev temperament, be viewed as a forward response to an improved strategic position. If this is so, it indicates that aggressive responses to ward off weakness do not preclude similar responses in improved strategic circumstances. These may be motivated both by the cautionary view that her increased strength may not as yet be sufficient for all future contingencies, and by the likely Soviet judgment that the only *proof* of improvement in her strategic position is the ability to render manifest and imposing the power that she wields and to translate it into political-military advances in the international arena.

It remains to ask whether Soviet action in the postwar period bore a different relation to a strategic balance defined more broadly than above. In the first years after World War II the Soviets did not disarm as quickly as the United States and, while it was of course nuclearly inferior, the balance of conventional forces, the opportunities generated by postwar political upheavals, communist successes in China, the acquisition by the Soviets of the Eastern European satellites and, above all, U.S. reluctance to exercise nuclear diplomacy, together with a Western reaction of despair in the face of Soviet action in Eastern Europe and Germany, all combined to define a strategic situation or a strategic balance very different from that defined in terms of nuclear intercontinental warfare. The nuclear component in the US-SU balance was, in any case, less imposing than it might seem, since for the Soviets the risk of nuclear attack by the United States without being given an opportunity to withdraw was small. How completely the West was on the defensive is still reflected in current evaluations of the Berlin Blockade (11 months of costly deprivation of an access guaranteed by the Potsdam agreements) as being the Soviet Union's first big defeat in the Cold War. Under the broader definition of the strategic situation, then, Soviet action in Iran, Turkey, Greece, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia, and finally Korea coincides with a balance of power not unfavorable to her.

Similarly the Berlin Wall and the introduction of missiles in Cuba a decade later seem less risky when viewed in relation to Soviet missile and nuclear tests, to Sputnik and the first manned space flight that provided opportunities for nuclear blackmail, opportunities made all the greater by the failure of the United States to take stronger steps to counteract the political effects of the missile gap myth. Thus, although the nuclear balance rested strongly in favor of the United States, a strategic balance defined to include factors such as alliance morale, European theatre capabilities, and political initiative cannot be assessed as so favorable to the United States.

Again, the avoidance by the Soviet Union since the dismissal of Khrushchev of direct confrontation with the United States might

be related to the deepening conflict with China and the difficulties in Eastern Europe reflected by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The conflict with China had, of course, already begun at the time of Berlin and Cuba, but may have been taken more seriously after the failure of the 1963 effort at rapprochement. Taking into account the loss of Red China as an important ally and its acquisition as an even more important enemy, one might view the Soviet strategic position as having, in one major respect, deteriorated beginning in the sixties despite the fact that in the missile field she was rapidly catching up with the United States.

Thus in the postwar period Soviet intergovernmental behavior seemed on the whole to show an inverse relation between military power (narrowly defined in terms of nuclear forces) and aggressive behavior vis-à-vis the West; but when we view the Soviet strategic position in the broadest sense to take account of political factors favorable to the Soviets, this inverse relation largely disappears and Soviet aggressiveness appears associated with a by no means unsatisfactory strategic position.

When one reviews Soviet behavior over the past half century, no simple picture emerges. This is not only because the historical record is incomplete and sometimes difficult to decipher, motives generally being hard to establish and especially so among Soviet political figures. The relations discussed in the preceding pages fail to fall into a simple pattern because Soviet behavior has very likely been determined by many factors, some of which we have touched on above -- ideological proclivities, preferred political strategies and dispositions, the experience of particular failures and successes, the ambitions, "style" and personality of different leaders and their domestic power struggles, competition within and between military and civilian bureaucracies, the political and economic state of the West, the Third World, and of the Soviet bloc at different periods, and Soviet assessment of, and her emphasis on, national morale and political warfare. The military balance as an influence has had to vie with these and perhaps other influences. The forecasting of future Soviet behavior can draw from the past, not a simple relation to extrapolate or

to apply in the future, but only an understanding of certain persistent tendencies in Soviet behavior, and judgments on how these might combine with various constellations of factors to affect the decisions of Soviet leaders.

PART III

The Seventies

WHAT DO THESE ANALYSES of the past suggest about Soviet behavior during the coming decade under conditions of strategic parity? How will the political and military conditions of the seventies shape Soviet objectives and strategies?

Soviet objectives will remain in the seventies as they were in the past, subordinate to the first objective of the Politburo -- Soviet security and whatever it deems an essential component of it. This objective embraces, more especially, the integrity of Soviet borders, the adhesion of the Eastern European states, the defense of the Party, and the strength of its armed forces.

These first priority security objectives are, naturally, largely defensive in character. But the Soviet strategic and political position is too powerful to confine her to a Soviet "fortress" posture and especially so since, as the historical record shows, the Politburo esteems highly the value of buffer zones and of a "forward" or offensive posture, an appreciation that strategic parity with the United States will enable her to indulge more freely. That this is so should not lead one to forget what her top priority requirements are. A person who is well-to-do may show little day-to-day concern with basic necessities, but it would be a mistake to ignore their top priority status. Czechoslovakia, 1968, illustrates this point.

In the seventies the Soviets may be inclined to expand the list of political and military "necessities," and for the following reason -- the growth of Chinese power and the possibility of an alliance of U.S. (Western) nuclear and technical capabilities with Chinese

manpower.* Both the Party and the Soviet military are likely to have the ingenuity, the suspiciousness, and the self-interest required to generate scenarios for this alliance.

The Soviet Union and the Third World

For its minimal and therefore highest priority objectives, the Soviet Union will depend little in the seventies on its relations with the Third World. Only once in the sixties did a Third World country enter into these prime Soviet security concerns. In 1962 Cuba was able to provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to lessen the strategic imbalance and thus to serve a high-priority Soviet security concern. In the seventies, under conditions of strategic parity with the United States, urgent military use of a Third World country is less likely to occur. This does not mean that Third World countries will not be used by the Soviets for important national security purposes. It only means that under the assumption of strategic parity such uses are not likely to be in the service of the most urgent military necessities. Consequently great risks in the Third World are less likely to be taken and high costs are less likely to be paid. Nevertheless, one exception to the foregoing suggests itself. Just as the Soviets sought to use Cuba in 1962 to compensate for U.S. nuclear superiority, so they may attempt, if there is a continuing or especially an increasing conflict with China, to compensate for Chinese manpower superiority by providing increased military aid to enable the Indian military to exploit more fully its own considerable

* This was written before the occurrence of "ping-pong diplomacy" and the visit of Henry Kissinger to Peking in July 1971. These events have no doubt increased Soviet concern, but it is worth noting that for the Soviets (and for the present analyst) these recent events are outgrowths of more basic conditions that led to them, rather than being themselves the basis for predicting new political possibilities.

manpower.* This will risk an acute conflict with Pakistan and throw the latter more fully into China's arms, unless in the meantime the Pakistani-Indian conflict has been resolved, which seems an unlikely development.

In her "second order" security objectives (which will nonetheless represent the day-to-day preoccupations of Soviet policy), Soviet relations with the Third World will play a substantial role. Such relations by themselves would represent a modest interest compared with Soviet preoccupations with the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan were it not for the fact that her Third World relations are an important aspect of her political and military concerns with the major powers, just as their Third World concerns are an important aspect of their political and military concerns with the Soviet Union.

Soviet "second order" security interests in the Third World will include the limitation or elimination of Chinese and other ultra-left influences, especially in those Third World areas where the Soviet Union has a strong official political presence and/or an important Communist Party, either one of whose influence could be endangered by a political movement to the left of Soviet Communism. The Soviets will be particularly active in those areas which border on the Soviet Union and China or are contiguous to areas that do -- that is, especially the Middle East and South Asia. Ultra-left groups, whether "Maoist"** or not, are likely to be viewed as dangerous not only

*This was written before the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation of August 9, 1971, a 20-year mutual defense (consultation) treaty. Here again (see preceding footnote), this particular event should not be taken so much as the predictor of future Soviet-Indian mutual military interests and cooperation, as it is the outcome of more basic factors that have rendered Soviet-Indian military relations increasingly close during the past decade and will continue to do so in the present one.

**Most so-called Maoist groups appear to have little or no relations with Red China. In Latin America, Red China has not shown any great interest in groups that sometimes call themselves Maoist. If, however, the Chinese acquire a genuine investment in particular revolutionary groups, the Soviets may find that their own interest in not exacerbating relations with China may force them to deal circumspectly

because they tend to have a special hostility to the Soviet Union, but because they disrupt the political and economic framework in which the Soviets are now able to work with great success and reintroduce a type of political game in which Soviet competitive advantages have largely disappeared. Of course a Soviet effort in this direction could revive, if necessary, skills and capabilities now partially dormant.

The Soviet attempt to eliminate or discredit anti-Soviet left groups in the Third World may have to be supplemented in some instances by an attempt to win over left political movements by providing discreet support for them even at the risk of jeopardizing government-to-government relations. The apparent Soviet willingness both to allow her Ecuadorian embassy personnel to help foment a local strike and to permit the transfer of Mexican students to North Korea (via East Berlin and the Soviet Union) for revolutionary training, although a much more restrained involvement than that practiced in earlier years by her own intelligence, commercial, and diplomatic personnel, indicates a Soviet sense of pressure to permit some collaboration with left movements. This is all the more striking since Soviet anxiety to put her best foot forward in Latin America is quite evident. It would be helpful to know to what extent the difficulties created for Soviet diplomacy by Soviet intelligence and undercover operations represent two bureaucracies working at cross-purposes or two strains of policy neither one of which can be entirely dispensed with.

The displacement of the United States (and Western and Japanese) presence and influence in Third World countries by the Soviets will, in most instances, be neither feasible nor from a Soviet standpoint entirely desirable. The Soviets cannot for the moment provide the capital, the trade, or the cultural contacts that most Third World countries seek. Even when political motives lead to a rejection of the United States, most Third World countries will find West Germany and Japan, and, especially where cultural relations are also involved, Italy, Britain, and France, as or more useful than the Soviets. Three factors, however, will in the longer run assist the Soviets. As the

with these groups. This will probably become all the more necessary if Chinese influence in the Third World develops along more "responsible" lines acceptable to local governments.

decade moves on, Soviet ability to provide capital assistance and to absorb Third World semi-manufactured and manufactured goods (as well as raw materials) will probably improve. Secondly, the large role of government and semi-autonomous government corporations in Third World economies leads to some preferences by Third World administrators and leaders for doing business with other governments and government agencies rather than with private enterprise.* Thirdly, Third World countries with socialist governments or governments with anti-capitalist leanings, will be anxious to avoid a too great dependence on the United States and other capitalist countries who will be suspected, even when there is no foundation for this, of being secretly hostile to them. This will especially be suspected if a Third World government has engaged in expropriations or is planning eventually to do so. Even Third World governments that are nationalistic and not particularly leftist will find that trade relations with the Soviet Union are useful as a means of undercutting the political appeal of party rivals on their left who could take political advantage of the government's too exclusive relations with, or dependence on, the capitalist countries.

The Soviets will be able, as they have in the past, to shape economic transactions and policy to provide for maximum political impact and to maintain a presence sufficient to provide a platform for political maneuvers intended to counter Western projects and to enhance their own particular designs as circumstances dictate.

Soviet political and economic influence and military assistance programs may be used to obtain naval, air, and possibly rocket bases in Third World countries. The continuing threat of their future availability to the Soviets may prove to be as important as their actual realization. Naval bases will be useful to the Soviet Union

* Italy and France also benefit from this. The tendency to turn trade and investment into a government-to-government activity is not only related to bureaucratic preferences for dealing with their counterparts rather than with private enterprisers, but also to the avoidance of introducing private capital and private business interests into countries whose nationalistic and ideological tendencies make foreign private enterprise suspect.

for peacetime operations and wartime threats, but her foreign relations will give her opportunities to "show the flag" without the expense of naval bases. The flagship of the Soviet naval group that visited the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico in 1969 spent four days in Fort de France (Martinique), indicating that for some purposes the Soviet navy is not dependent on Cuba when it wants to sail the Caribbean. Similarly, Soviet warships in the Mediterranean are not dependent on Middle East naval bases for oil and dry supplies, which they can also get from their own support ships that have been provisioned at Mediterranean ports such as Reggio Calabria, Genoa, Malta, and Gibraltar. The Soviet navy may, as time goes by, find that, like the Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and South African navies, it is welcome to engage in naval exercises with Latin American states -- exercises that are politically motivated goodwill missions and do not involve mutual security arrangements.

Soviet access to Third World countries for bases will vary with the importance and diversity of the country's world relations. A country such as Chile has every reason, for the time being, to conform to President Salvador Allende's statement that Chile will not permit any foreign country to establish bases. However, Chile, like other socialist countries, will continue the process, begun by President Eduardo Frei in 1964, of freeing herself as much as possible from dependence on United States trade and investment. After a sufficient measure of independence has been achieved, ideological convictions and existing hostility to the United States will more readily facilitate Soviet influence over Chilean policy. In the meantime, as long as the United States has not attempted to cut Chile off, U.S. capital and trade are sufficiently important to avoid behavior that would jeopardize Chile without compensatory gains; besides, for a country like Chile, the Soviets are not likely to provide enough in return -- with, perhaps, two exceptions.

First, a Chile threatened by another Latin American country would almost certainly seek a protector. If Chile is threatened because it has moved down the Soviet political and economic path, this protector might be the Soviet Union. In this case, the Soviets would have

little difficulty in obtaining base rights.* Is this a price that the Soviets would be willing to pay, especially if there is a possibility of U.S. support for Chile's Latin American antagonist? Soviet desire for a west coast South American naval base would have to be substantial if it required risking a UAR-Israel situation in a less favorable Western Hemisphere setting.

A second opportunity for the Soviets to acquire naval bases in South America could develop in a period in which Chilean and, say, Peruvian diversification had led to a lesser dependence on the United States, and consequently to confiscations and other acts that have created further breaches between these countries and the United States. This combined with a not unlikely economic failure of these governments might produce a situation where they would not or could not be bailed out by the United States and would be ready to make concessions to the Soviet Union in return for economic help. It appears that Soviet credits to Chile, granted in 1966 and, like so many Soviet credits, still unutilized, are going to be applied to the construction of a large fishing port in Valparaiso. An agreement has also been reached between the Soviets and the Peruvians for the construction by the former of a Peruvian industrial fishing port. These two ventures, if

*The apparent sighting of three Soviet submarines by Argentinian naval forces during maneuvers in the waters off Tierra del Fuego suggests that the Soviets may be able to provide some restraint on Argentinian action even in this distant area. Still, the Soviets probably could not effectively provide rapid military aid from a Cuban base if limited action between Argentina and Chile broke out in the area of sharpest friction, the Strait of Magellan. In the meantime, the threat of a Brazilian hegemony in Latin America together with domestic political factors have led to a Chilean-Argentinian reconciliation that may provide one less source of friction between them that could be exploited by powers within or external to Latin America.

No doubt the Soviet ability to operate over long distances will improve over the decade, but for the moment Latin American leaders have probably not forgotten that the promised Soviet air bridge (from the Soviet Union to Lima) of 65 planes to bring disaster relief after the 1970 Peruvian earthquake broke down after the 21st plane arrived (after considerable delay) and that the Soviets had to announce that the rest of the relief supplies would come by boat. Such events probably do not have an enduring influence on Latin American (or Third World) judgments concerning Soviet capabilities.

in fact undertaken, will no doubt provide the Soviets with some useful experience in South American west coast waters and could still be under way at a time when the foregoing conditions are realized and ancillary Soviet uses for these ports develop.

Just as most of the larger Third World countries will have an interest in avoiding too close identification with either the Soviet or U.S. sides, so too they will want, as Chinese economic and political relations become increasingly attractive, to steer, if possible, a neutral course between the two communist giants as long as the latter remain at each other's throats. Thus, the more relations are strained between the major powers, the less inclined Third World countries (that do not, like the UAR, have important security requirements or are not in deep economic difficulties) will be to get involved in military relations and the more inclined to confine relations to aid, trade, and cultural exchanges.

Still, a decade is a substantial stretch of time and there are about 100 Third World countries. Evidently over the course of a decade many things may happen, especially conflicts among and within Third World countries, that will provide excellent opportunities for the Soviet Union if it is determined to acquire a worldwide network of bases. Smaller, poorer Third World countries with limited relations with the rest of the world could enable the Soviets to acquire bases more cheaply than might be possible with the larger Third World nations. But even the latter, like the UAR, sometimes have important security requirements that provide an easy opening for the Soviets, or, like Algeria, are not immune from the temptation to show their independence from a patron country by substituting dependence on the Soviets. If Soviet resources and determination are assumed, it is reasonable to assume also that the difficulties indicated earlier are not likely over the long run to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a network of bases. The cost of and success in such a program will, however, not be independent of U.S. policies which have at their disposal, at least in some countries, trade, investment, and aid instruments quite capable of competing, if it seems worthwhile, with Soviet inducements.

An additional and obvious reason for increased Soviet relations with the Third World is one that also enters into the relations of most of the great powers with the less developed countries -- the present and future economic importance of Third World countries both as exporters and importers and also as political powers in various world deliberations, political, economic, and technical.* The Soviet Union is not, for the time being, acutely in need of the natural resources or other products of the Third World with the major exception of natural rubber. In this respect her position is very different from countries like Japan and some Western European nations, and is better than the position of the United States, which is more dependent than the Soviet Union on a number of mineral and other imports. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union would benefit, and increasingly so if it becomes more of a consumer society, from the advantages of the international division of labor, and all the more so since her trade with the Third World would enable her to acquire useful products without the need for hard currency payments. Soviet policy and Soviet writings reflect a concern with the relative insulation of Soviet trade, and it is questionable that Soviet economic penetration of the Third World is so completely dominated by political considerations as some analysts believe. Soviet concern over the (partial) success of Third World countries, which have not had privileged treatment in the EEC or the Commonwealth markets, in finally penetrating the barriers to these markets and to the Japanese market, seems to reflect a Soviet fear of increasing polarization of international economic life, with the Third World drawing economically (and therefore probably politically) closer to the Western powers, thus depriving the Soviet Union of an opportunity to break more fully into world trade.

Soviet influence in, or control over, some Third World areas may enable it to threaten, and if need be to effect, economic attacks (oil

* The tendency to view the UN as an impotent organization of no importance is a reaction by some to excessive expectations and among others as a form of over-sophistication. The political significance of the warfare waged within the UN and its subsidiary bodies is by no means trivial. But this paper is not the place to try to demonstrate this.

and other embargos; control of "private" or quasi-private waterways such as Suez) against other world powers if issues of sufficient importance dictate such measures. Strategic parity would provide her not so much with the requisite power over the Third World as with the diminished risk of employing her Third World relations to her advantage by being able to forestall or resist counterthreats from the major powers. Thus strategic parity or superiority may become useful not to make military threats to achieve particular objectives, but rather to enable the Soviet Union to employ her "general purpose" political power in the Third World as an economic instrument against the industrial countries, reserving as much as possible her improved nuclear strategic status to give her political weapons maximum freedom of maneuver. Thus, for example, such economic threats might be employed against Japan's imports from the Third World under circumstances in which Japan may seem, independently or in consort with China or the United States, to be threatening Soviet interests or security.

Quite apart from specific political, military, and economic motives, two factors will preserve Soviet Third World relations from neglect: (a) Soviet relations with the Third World will not require or signify a loss of attention to other and more important countries. The Soviet decisionmaking and executive apparatus -- diplomatic, military, and civil -- is not any more likely to be overcharged or "saturated" in the seventies than was the corresponding U.S. apparatus in the sixties with its worldwide preoccupations and physical presence at all levels and in all spheres of action. (b) Soviet Third World penetration will be strengthened by the desire of the Third World to develop (not always without precautions) relations with the Soviets, and by the apparent ease with which the Soviets will be able to make headway as compared with the slow-moving pace of relations with the advanced nations.

There are some offsetting difficulties that have already suggested caution to the Soviets. Although the labile character of Third World politics often permits rapid gains for the outsider, political instability and rapid changes in political fortunes equally risk losses.

In addition, any Soviet ambitions to be the Americans (or the Romans) of the Third World in the seventies will be handicapped by substantial residues of an iron curtain mentality that forbids too much exposure to non-Soviet contacts. Thus only the Soviet bloc abstained in 1969 in an otherwise unanimous UN Assembly vote in favor of a UN volunteer youth service program for the Third World with teams of mixed nationalities. This is not cited as an action of sufficient importance to affect Soviet Third World relations, but the attitude and apprehensions that underlie it will be a handicap in Soviet attempts to impress its personality on Third World peoples. Western European successes in past colonial and present Third World areas have been due not only to coercion and inducements but also to the character of the social and political life that Europeans exemplified both at home and abroad. It is difficult to evaluate these less tangible factors in international relations but it seems that Soviet representatives have yet to acquire (or have not been allowed to acquire) an appealing presence in foreign lands.

A third limitation on Soviet Third World ambitions is the greater cultural prestige of the Western nations. In countries such as Latin America the cultural affinities of the middle and upper classes with Western Europe and the United States can hardly be offset by Soviet offerings. The Russians have had considerable success with their well-recognized capabilities in such fields as ballet, music, the folk dance, and chess. But these provide only a temporary spectator appreciation and do not touch more closely the cultural aspirations of their audiences. In Africa, in areas of former French and British rule, political alienation has not removed ties to European cultural life. While Arabization and other movements to increase the prestige of indigenous culture may lessen the cultural ties to Europe, it is not likely, at least during the seventies, that the Russian language, Soviet history, or the Soviet cultural personality will make a great impression. On the other hand, as populations whose élites have had only limited contact with Europe develop increased literacy, it is possible that political and ideological relations may serve as a bridge to cultural interests that have their locus in the Eastern bloc.

In South and Southeast Asia, the impress of Soviet culture is likely to be minor except as one representative of Western technology. It is difficult to know to what extent a major power can exercise an enduring and substantial influence of a noncoercive character over another nation when their cultural contact is limited and when the cultural prestige or importance of the big power is not very great for the smaller power. The political role of Western culture in the Third World may alter as national independence and national pride insulate countries from the influences that cultural relations in the past had on politics; still it is likely that for the decade of the seventies Soviet imperialism will find itself handicapped by its inability to associate cultural affinities with economic and military ties.

There is a fourth difficulty that the Soviet Union increasingly meets as it expands its relations in the Third World. Like the United States, the Russians as a big power find themselves pursuing activities in one part of the world that conflict with their objectives elsewhere. Thus Soviet attempts, on behalf of East Germany, to limit West German participation in United Nations aid activities was resented by Third World countries that received substantial West German aid. Similarly, Soviet support, together with the United States, for a 12-mile territorial seas limit has created difficulties for her in Latin America where her ambassador to Ecuador has been accused of doing "diplomatic pirouettes."

The Russians have since 1955 pursued a forward policy in the Third World under varying states of the strategic balance. There is little or no reason to believe that strategic parity or superiority will lead them to relax their evident efforts to increase their influence over Third World governments and peoples. These increments of power are useful to the Soviets both with respect to objectives that center in the Third World itself and with those that center around the interests of the Western powers and China in the Third World. Soviet influence over Third World policies will not be closely dependent on her improved strategic situation* but she will benefit in some measure from it.

* Soviet prestige as a military power at the end of the fifties when she was in a markedly inferior strategic position (narrow

Strategic parity or superiority may facilitate the choice of the Soviet Union as a patron by Third World countries that prefer to associate with the strong (provided such association is not too threatening)* and especially so if the United States and other Western nations suffer political defeats at the hands of the Soviet Union. Strategic superiority may also assist the Soviets in the Third World by making more of their resources available for military and economic aid. Improvements in Soviet ability to influence Third World policies from these and other sources will in their turn mean a further strengthening of the Soviet overall strategic position through the political, economic, and military gains that these will permit.

The Communist Countries

A Soviet diplomat has told the following story to a Western colleague. In the future Soviet-Chinese war, "On the first day, we capture 100,000 Chinese; on the second day, we capture one million Chinese; on the third day, we capture ten million Chinese; on the fourth day, we capture 100 million Chinese; on the fifth day, we surrender."

A political scientist from the Karl Marx University in Budapest has reported in a Western journal the results of his Western-style statistical study of "Twenty-five Years of Local Wars." In discussing

definition) was greater than that of the United States among a number of the Third World populations largely as a result of her nuclear diplomacy, her well-propagandized weapons tests, and Sputnik. After the United States lost much of its strategic superiority, these same Third World countries became convinced that the United States was militarily superior, in part apparently as a result of Cuba and Apollo 11. More recently a new shift in judgment seems to be setting in, but no clear picture is available of what different élites and masses think of the strategic balance.

*The distance of the Soviet Union from much of the Third World facilitates relations by quieting apprehensions, especially in areas such as Latin America, which feels itself too close to the United States but far from the Soviet Union.

the treatment of his data he refers to the 1969 Soviet-Chinese clashes on the Ussuri as follows: "We have not qualified them as war, although posterity might regard them as battles of a long war and not merely as frontier incidents." An important part of political reality are expectations, even those to which low probabilities may be assigned. When a Hungarian political analyst can matter-of-factly write the foregoing in a Western journal, he is probably not indulging an idiosyncratic view or a view that higher political levels in Hungary or the Soviet Union are at any pains to discourage, either at home or in the West.

A country that possesses 150 million males of military age and is rapidly approaching a population of one billion,* that at the same time has a growing nuclear capability, is a declared ideological enemy of the Soviet Union, has published a map of China irredenta labeled "Areas Stolen by the Soviet Union" (showing nine regions beginning with Kazakh taken in 1842 to Outer Mongolia taken in 1925), and shares a common border of several thousand miles, part of which was the scene of military clashes in 1969, is not a neighbor easily disregarded.

The possibility is difficult for Americans to absorb that the Soviet Union may no longer consider the United States her most *dangerous* enemy, although certainly her *strongest* enemy. As the present decade wears on, Soviet preoccupation with China will probably grow, a preoccupation that nuclear parity/superiority is not likely to erase. The Soviets no longer seem committed to the belief that the United States and the West are waiting to annihilate them if opportunity permits, although they probably do not view this as an irreversible state of affairs. In any event, Soviet parity/superiority combined with the political climate of the Western nuclear powers assures the Soviets as well as can be expected for the foreseeable future of the deterrence of the United States and Western Europe. In evaluating where their greatest hazards lie, the nuclear superiority of the

* Peking currently derives no satisfaction from the "evil wind of early marriage." In Moscow, naturally, "to increase the birthrate is one of our country's urgent problems."

United States over China may not be for the Soviets the most relevant aspect of the situation. What may well concern them more is that they are going to have to balance Chinese manpower superiority with a nuclear superiority that eventually may be stalemated by Chinese nuclear forces.* They may thus find themselves in the position of the West when it relied on a (diminishing) nuclear superiority to balance Soviet conventional forces. It is not likely that the Russians will derive much long-range comfort from the reflection that they are also still superior to China in conventional warfare capabilities. Perhaps it might be easier for the United States to understand the Soviet position if we think of ourselves as having to deal with Soviet military power *while at the same time* facing a Red China located where Canada now is.

Soviet leaders, like most European political leaders, generally have a longer time perspective and shape policy with longer future periods in mind than is customary in the United States.** To say that the Soviets are preoccupied with China is not, therefore, to say that they expect imminent war or all-out war in some indeterminate future.*** Nor does it even mean that they exclude the possibility of a cautious rapprochement.**** But their strategic planning will surely increasingly

* No doubt the Russians were not put at ease by Mao's statement that he did not understand why the Russians were disturbed simply because the Chinese were very busy building shelters. After all, asked Mao, if the Chinese get into their shelters, how can they attack their enemies?

** This difference is frequently disregarded. At one time United States views exaggerated how different we were (fortunately) from others. In more recent years, this has been replaced by the "sophisticated" view that we have all converged into one undifferentiated heap.

*** On the contrary, future hostilities between the Soviet Union and China, if they occur, could well follow the pattern of sporadic battles or localized, limited wars similar to the Japanese-Soviet engagements of 1939.

**** The omission of attacks on China by any of the Soviet generals in this year's Soviet armed forces day celebration, together with an increase in Chinese-Soviet trade (still only about 5 percent of what it was in 1959), represents some alleviation of tension. Without discounting the possibility of an even greater improvement in the coming years, these changes can have relatively little bearing on Soviet long-range policy on China.

take into account that they face two very different potential enemies on two very different and geographically separated fronts. In the absence of major changes, Soviet political and military planning in the seventies will probably lean heavily on the supposition of neutralization of the West and a more uncertain future in the East.

In these circumstances Soviet nuclear parity with, or superiority over, the United States is not likely to provide the Soviets with the high degree of satisfaction that we might infer from our own great concern about it. Parity/superiority no doubt is important to the Soviets both with respect to their security vis-à-vis the United States, with respect to their political objectives around the world, and finally, with respect to the greater freedom it confers in committing forces against China. Nonetheless, the new Soviet law on universal military service and the emphasis on preinduction military training in schools and factories and on the need for a deeper patriotism seem related to a period characterized by the Russians as an "increasingly complicated international situation," which is "complicated" precisely because it is another Communist power -- rather than the United States -- that threatens the Soviet Union.

There appears to be no evidence of a lively fear on the part of either the Soviet military, the political leaders, or the people. While many Russians have a rather cynical view of the political leadership, the Party, and Soviet efficiency, they apparently believe that at least in military affairs the Soviets are well prepared and capable, a state of confidence that finds psychological support in what appears to be a widespread hostility toward the Chinese. Indeed, it seems clear that in the unlikely event Soviet political leaders or the Soviet military thought that war was necessary to divert domestic attention from other matters, they would view the Russian people as readier to support a war against China than one against the West.*

*The inevitable vision of a "war of the races" no doubt adds a special note to Soviet views of China. Indeed it is true that in 1958-1959 when friction between the Soviet Union and China was rapidly developing, China reverted to a militant, hard-line position in the Third World and stressed the unifying importance of color.

The Soviet need to devote sizeable resources to dealing with the Chinese will in the seventies increasingly be a source of special aggravation to them. In most other parts of the world wherever the Soviet Union confronts its "traditional" enemy, the West, she is able to pursue objectives that provide positive rewards or gains while serving her need to improve indefinitely her defensive positions. In the East, however, the situation is different. The Soviets are not interested in "conquering" China. In the East they are in the unhappy position of having largely defensive objectives with few positive gains to offset the costs of defense. In brief, the Soviets may find themselves acting or having to act in the East the way the West acts vis-à-vis them — a position that is certainly not congenial to the Soviet political temperament and that might, perhaps, lead to demands to "liquidate" the problem although an acceptable form of liquidation providing long-term security is not easy to find.

The Soviet Union has additional concerns that nuclear superiority will not dissipate. Soviet leaders congratulate themselves that Soviet society is not, like the United States and, to a lesser extent, some other Western countries, deeply divided by social disorders and moral decline.* Nonetheless they too have their domestic concerns which arise from challenges to Party and bureaucratic requirements for control, discipline, and conformity. The well-advertised existence of dissent among Soviet artists, writers, scientists, and students represents a numerically inconsequential number of persons. Nonetheless there are some features of the situation which should be noted. Despite the persistent conservatism and anti-Western attitudes of many Party members and bureaucrats,** the Soviet administration has had difficulty mustering

* Both the Soviets and the Chinese seem to be equally fascinated by manifestations of political dissent, disaffection, and moral collapse in the United States and the Western world, an interest that is perhaps all the keener because events in their own countries give them a personal interest in such questions. It seems as if Soviet and Chinese Communists, good Marxists though they may be, hope not so much for the collapse of U.S. capitalism as for the moral disintegration of American society.

** How much the old style Soviet Party Communist resented the liberalization of the Khrushchev era is reflected by an outburst, reported

the will to suppress these activities completely. In part, this seems due to the penetration in the bureaucracies, often at fairly high levels, of the attitudes to be repressed. An interesting parallel exists in this respect between the United States and the Soviet Union. Speaking of the post-Stalin period, Stalin's daughter in her memoir points out that in some families of the top Politburo elite, the young people, the children, determined the mode of life in the homes. Their elders "lent an ear and adapted themselves to the views and tastes of their children." Since the children represented an anti-establishment outlook this aided the penetration of more liberal views and tastes into groups that otherwise might have been immune to their appeal. Similarly, Daniel Patrick Moynihan has pointed out the considerable hostility of top businessmen and bankers to the Nixon Administration because of an alleged reduction of civil liberties. "As best as I can tell, they mostly get this belief from their children . . . they believe their children and . . . detest the Administration."

The conflict between liberalism and party conservatism appears to be related, at least in the minds of the conservatives, to failures of patriotism, to the tendency to make "a laughing stock of the love of one's native land," a disposition presumably of no serious consequence should the Soviets want to challenge the East, but of more significance should they want to challenge the Western powers. In this regard the disaffection of Eastern European populations from Soviet leadership is perhaps more serious. Soviet officials who observed the aftermath of the 1971 world ice hockey match in Prague in which Czechoslovakia defeated the Soviet Union 5 to 2, are not likely to want to stake the safety of their lines of communication in the event of hostilities on the loyalty of this nation. Nor are the Soviets likely to find any comfort in the impending* presence of Chinese engineers and technicians in Rumania working in connection with a quarter billion dollar Chinese interest-free loan. The Soviet Union will probably have reason to fear Eastern European attempts to take advantage in the future of

by Stalin's daughter, by Mrs. Molotov, with her husband nodding assent: "There is only one hope left -- China."

*That is, "impending" if the Brezhnev Doctrine is not invoked.

Chinese pressures on her, to disengage themselves from Soviet controls. Still, sporadic military outbreaks in the East with China will hardly prevent the Soviet Union from being able to exercise the same military pressures on Eastern Europe of which she is currently capable. A Soviet failure to repress Eastern European restiveness is more likely, if it occurs at all, to be the result of increasing fear of finding herself surrounded by hostile populations on her Western borders at the same time as she faces a greater challenge in the East. But such a Soviet sensitivity would reflect either a Soviet conviction that Eastern European armies were prepared to resist her or, if this is not the case, a change in the political temperament or "nerve" of Soviet leaders for which there is not as yet adequate evidence.

The uneasiness of the Soviet political and bureaucratic class in the face of an increasing freedom of criticism may be intensified in the seventies by the continuation and possibly the intensification of nationalist sentiments in Soviet populations. The 1970 Soviet census suggests that Russians will be a minority in 10 to 15 years, and that the various Slav groups (primarily Russians and Ukrainians) will be a minority by the year 2000. In 1970 there were 35 million Moslems in the Soviet Union, a 44 percent increase over the 1959 figure. Nationalist feelings are already said to provide a problem in the Soviet Union and perhaps this is supported by the persistence with which various ethnic groups have clung to their languages and, in some cases, have increased since the last census (1959) the proportion speaking the native tongue. This nationalism is not only the nationalism of the non-Russian nationalities. There is also a Great Russian nationalism and among some intellectuals a Slavophil ideology about which the political leadership apparently has mixed feelings since the nationality situation in the Soviet Union renders awkward and perhaps dangerous a patriotism that is based on a particular set of ethnic groups rather than on the nation at large.

The slowdown in economic growth together with a period of increasing pressure for consumer satisfaction also creates a problem for the Soviets. While the possibilities of repression and control are, to say the least, far from exhausted, the Soviets no doubt are sensitive to the significance of the December 1970 riots in Poland.

Materials describing the mood of life in various sectors of the Soviet population reflect a desire to be able to relax and enjoy some of the deferred rewards of the postwar economy. Elements in the population that have reached positions of ease seem anxious that nothing should happen domestically or internationally that would risk their gains. Thus military officers and top bureaucrats who live, on the whole, extremely well, give the impression that they might be the very last persons to want to risk the loss of their agreeable form of life by getting involved in anything so disruptive as a war or even intense international conflicts that might risk their standard of living and their leisure. For officialdom, the avoidance of excessive repression of dissidents seems partly related to a preference for letting things go on quietly without producing a crisis that would interfere with their own desires for a quiet life. A return to the repression and controls of the Stalin period would introduce stresses that would affect their own comfort as well as that of the "westernizing" groups.

The Soviet Union has, then, some problems that we could easily underestimate because of our preoccupation with the difficulties facing the United States. The Soviet security situation may seem very good compared with our own, but what impresses the United States -- for example the Soviet navy showing up in many parts of the world and Soviet missiles increasing in number -- are developments, proud as the Soviets may be of them, that only partially dissipate the difficulties that preoccupy Soviet leaders.

The Soviet Union and Japan

If the Soviets, with the Soviet-Chinese conflict in mind, are interested in mending fences, then they surely should be doing so with Japan. The record is in fact highly suggestive of Soviet courtship. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 Japan renounced all title to South Sakhalin* and the Kurile Islands that had been occupied by

* Acquired by Japan from Russia following the war of 1905.

the Soviets in 1945 when they entered the war against Japan and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1946. In 1956, a Soviet-Japanese protocol ended the state of war that formally still existed between the two countries. The Japanese government contests Soviet rights to these territories on the grounds that the San Francisco treaty did not cede these territories to the Soviet Union, and that in any case the latter did not sign the treaty and thus has no claim. In addition, Japan contends that four islands held by the Soviets are an integral part of Japan and not part of the Kuriles. The Soviet Union has agreed to return two of these four islands to Japan after a peace treaty is concluded, but Japan insists on all four islands being returned and therefore has refused to conclude a treaty.*

In 1961 Prime Minister Ikeda expressed Japan's interest in reestablishing relations with Red China. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan went to Tokyo for the first Soviet trade fair in Japan and took a letter from Khrushchev which inveighed against Japanese relations with the United States. The Japanese rejected Soviet attempts at pressure and retorted that Mikoyan should have discussed Japanese fishing rights and her island claims instead of engaging in nuclear blackmail. This Soviet attempt both to disengage Japan from the United States and to intimidate her by tough talk was a characteristic form of Soviet wooing, caveman tactics generally being preferred initially to anything that might suggest weakness or require unnecessary concessions. The subsequent years suggest not so much a change in Soviet objectives as a revision of her methods in the face of Japanese stubbornness. Trade between the Soviet Union and Japan and between China and Japan both increased rapidly and gave the impression of a Soviet and Chinese rivalry to become major economic partners of Japan in the East. Soviet purchases from Japan increasingly involved long-term credit arrangements, in 1962 of six years length and in 1964 of ten years, thus providing the Soviet Union with the debtor's usual mild leverage over the creditor. These ten-year credits were established

*The four islands are Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu. The last two are the islands that the Soviet Union has so far refused to return.

during the course of Mikoyan's second visit to Japan, the anti-Chinese motive of which was taken for granted in Japan. In the same year, Kosygin provided a pendant to Khrushchev's aggressive letter of 1961 with one that suggested more interesting propositions and pointedly omitted any objection to the United States presence in Japan. In 1966 Foreign Minister Gromyko went a step further and explicitly stated that Soviet-Japanese relations need not be affected by Japanese-U.S. friendship which the Soviets fully understood. This may have expressed only a desire to reassure Japan, but it may also have expressed a Soviet awareness that a continuing United States presence in the Far East might be useful as a form of pressure on China.

In the meantime, in 1965, in 1966, and again in 1967 an important device for cementing Japanese-Soviet relations emerged -- various proposals for joint Soviet-Japanese exploitation of Siberian resources, pretty clearly intended to distract Japan from economic cooperation with China and to give the Japanese a stake in Siberian development that would be threatened in the event of Chinese-Soviet fighting in the area. Following the Soviet-Chinese clashes of 1969, Japan pushed vigorously in 1969 and 1970 for the return of her islands, despite Soviet protest against these anti-Soviet campaigns. The Soviets blamed Japan for the failure of a peace treaty to be signed and employed counterpressure in the form of four scheduled maneuvers that were almost surely intended to inconvenience Japanese shipping and fishing. However, after Japanese protests the Soviets canceled first one of the maneuvers and then all four of them. Prime Minister Sato reacted to further Soviet protest against Japanese agitation concerning the return of her islands by saying that their return was needed "for the further deepening of the friendly relations between the two countries," thus reemphasizing what the Japanese price was for a more wholehearted collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In recent years, Japan has acquired a strong interest in the exploitation of undersea oil deposits in the China Sea off Taiwan, and this source of conflict with Red China, which claims the deposits as her own, could considerably increase Soviet bargaining power with Japan by reducing the probability of close Chinese-Japanese relations.

Would the Soviet Union have needed to or wanted to court Japan so persistently, despite the clash over the disputed islands, had China remained an ally of the Soviet Union? And would the Soviets in this case have been so complaisant concerning the United States presence in Japan? This seems unlikely. The economic benefits that the Soviet Union and Japan both stand to derive from their trade and economic cooperation hardly mask the political motives involved in their relationship.

The Soviet Union will no doubt continue to develop her economic relations with Japan and to distract Japan as much as possible from close relations with China. She is unlikely to make more than minor concessions with respect to the former Japanese territories, at least until such time as she needs or wants to make major and specific demands on Japan that will require substantial Soviet concessions. It is not quite in the Soviet style to trade territory for such intangible commodities as "goodwill" or "friendship."

The Soviet Union and the West

The Soviet Union would seem to have two principal choices in the West.

A. She can attempt to establish more collaborative relations with the West than she has had, with the intent of freeing herself as much as she can from the possibility of being caught between two hostile camps. This policy could range from (i) avoiding in varying degrees her customary aggressive behavior intended to put the West on the defensive and to extend Soviet influence, and thereby keep the West reasonably calm and neutral, barring unforeseen political developments, to (ii) a more seductive, concessionary policy intended to provide for a more active economic and political collaboration, with perhaps in this case the hope of forestalling or reducing relations between the West and China, or perhaps obtaining Western cooperation, not necessarily military, against China.

B. Alternatively, the Soviets could view the West as inevitably hostile to it and likely, if the opportunity presented itself, to try

to make gains at her expense in East Europe, in the Third World, and possibly in Asia through cooperation with China. This view would require the Soviets to accept continuing problems both in the West and in the East and to develop the political and military instruments and policies suitable for a nonconciliatory, nonconcessionary posture in the West. There is another reason why the Soviets might choose policy B, a confidence that they are capable, at least for some years, of handling problems both in the West and the East and an unwillingness, therefore, to make unnecessary concessions to the West or to forego the substitution of their own influence for that of the United States.

It is not likely that at the present stage the Soviets have to make a clear-cut choice along the lines indicated above. In any case, policies A and B, especially the former, have many gradations and merge one into the other. The Soviets could move back and forth along this scale according as their predictions of the future, the speed and nature of various developments in the East and West, the shifts in Soviet leadership and domestic life, or quite unanticipated eventualities suggest a more conciliatory or a more aggressive policy. They will certainly maintain as many options open as possible. This will require them to pursue simultaneously elements of both policies A and B, even contradictory elements, until (and if) time begins to run out and they risk no longer having a choice unless they opt more fully for one or the other line.

Is it possible to say which way the wind is, or will be, blowing?

(1) The Soviet Union has an evident fear that Europe will become increasingly unified economically and politically and leave the Soviet Union and East Europe isolated within the Eurasian land mass. The prospective increase in EEC membership, the development of various unifying European conventions such as the uniform traffic code, the prospect of a single currency in Europe by 1980, together with some form of political union at perhaps a more distant time,^{*} is of great concern to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union put what roadblocks it

^{*} Even Pompidou has said, "A time will come when there will be a real European government."

was able to in this process by forcing the Finns to back out of NORDEK, thus discouraging the Scandinavian countries from developing a strong position for negotiating agreements with the EEC. Austria was also brought under Russian pressure because of her negotiations with the European Common Market. Evidently a more united Europe would be in a better position to resist Soviet pressure, to improve her military capabilities, and to develop possible threats against the Soviet bloc, or to seduce the East European countries. In addition, it might seriously hamper Soviet ambitions to diversify her foreign trade. Unfortunately, Soviet concern with these developments would make very good sense even if the Soviet Union had little concern over China. It cannot therefore be said that Soviet opposition to the economic unification of Europe is necessarily a response to China.

There is, however, one aspect of Soviet economic policy that lends itself more readily to the latter interpretation. This is the attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to involve the great powers in large-scale economic activity inside the Soviet Union. We have already noted above Soviet attempts to engage Japan in major projects in Siberia, which would give Japan important stakes there and also diminish incentives to pursue similar undertakings with China. Soviet industrial and especially automotive output can no doubt benefit through arrangements such as those that the Soviets have attempted to cultivate with varying degrees of success with Fiat, Renault, Ford, and more recently with Mack Trucks. That the invitation to major foreign capitalist and state enterprises has important political and not simply economic motives is not subject to proof barring a Soviet indiscretion. But the logic of this interpretation is clearly expressed in an *Izvestia* statement: "If it is to stand on solid ground, peaceful coexistence must be based on a sufficiently broad sphere of common interests and *must create sources of mutual advantage, which if lost, would be equally detrimental to every partner. This is precisely the underlying objective for combining two aspects of security -- the political and the economic* [emphasis added]. . . ."*

*One can suppose that in stressing economic relations whose loss would be "detrimental to every partner," the Soviets really mean whose

Soviet policy in response to European steps toward economic and political unification is not open to a single interpretation, but to the extent that the China motive is a factor in it, Soviet policy clearly leans here in the direction of policy A, that is, toward collaborative (economic) relations. These, however, do not entirely preclude adversary relations in other areas of interstate contact.

(2) A United States military presence in Europe will be no more satisfactory to the Soviets under the collaborative policy (A) than under the adversary policy (B). The Soviet Union will almost surely attempt to reduce the United States military and political presence in Europe regardless of which of these two policies she follows. Although this reduction is especially important for her if she intends to pursue an aggressive, expansionist position vis-à-vis the West, it is an almost equally desirable objective even if she opts for a more concessionary or collaborative policy. A reduced United States military presence, provided it is not fully compensated for by additional European defense measures, will make Europe more dependent on Soviet goodwill and good behavior and protect the Soviets in some measure against failures in, or a breakdown of, the collaborative policy. Thus under policies A and B, Soviet action will differ more in terms of the methods used to effect a reduction than in the objective itself. It is likely, then, that the Soviet Union has and will continue to have a very different attitude toward the United States presence in Europe and its presence in Japan or other parts of Asia. A United States presence in Asia will constitute for the Soviet Union an additional restraint, whether intended as such or not, on Red China and a possible threat to China of Soviet-United States military collaboration. The Soviets have, of course, to consider the possibility of a United States-Chinese military collaboration. But this is hardly likely to be the result of, or

loss would be especially detrimental to the participating Western nations. In effect, the Soviet Union appears to be trying to attach the Western countries not only through the attractions of increased trade or capital construction projects but also through more subtle effects arising from increased contacts and working relations and their influence in promoting an increased identification of Western and Russian interests.

dependent on, a prior United States military presence in Japan or in other parts of Asia.*

(3) Just as Chinese-Japanese relations induced the Soviets to court Japan more vigorously, so China's opening to the West** is likely to make the Soviets more responsive to the West and to give more weight to those options that are based on collaborative rather than aggressive, nonconcessionary relations. On the other hand, increased Chinese relations with the West will tend to reduce Japan's bargaining power with the Soviets. As long as Japan was one of the few technologically advanced nations maintaining substantial economic relations with China, Soviet interest in distracting her from too close relations with China was bound to be all the keener. But as China increasingly finds the resources of the Western world at her disposal, the previous advantageous position of Japan vis-à-vis the two communist powers will be diminished.***

(4) In interpreting Soviet present and future strategy, what meaning and how much weight are we to attach to her participation in SALT, her offer of talks on European troop reductions, her bilateral discussions with West Germany, her pursuit of a European security conference and consequent interest in a Berlin settlement? Perhaps the

* The supposition that the Soviet Union finds a United States Asian presence desirable, or at least not disagreeable, raises a question concerning United States attempts in 1970 to get the Soviets to use their good offices to facilitate a peace with Hanoi. This may have underestimated the satisfaction that the Soviets derived from a large United States military presence close to the Chinese border. Despite the cost to the Soviets of supporting Hanoi, the withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam may well be regretted by the Soviets partly as the removal of at least a mild restraint on Chinese military freedom and partly because it may precede a broader United States withdrawal from Asia, as well as freeing the U.S. budget for other military expenditures.

** See footnote, p. 38.

*** Red China's opening to the West may be an attempt to solve, among other problems, her need for advanced training for her scientists and technologists. In 1965, of the 188 members on the Natural Science and Technology boards of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 143 (70 percent) had been trained in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.

further evolution of these various negotiations will suggest more clearly an increased Soviet desire to negotiate real issues. Future progress on these matters, together with Soviet invitations to economic collaboration, might suggest the validity of a portrait of the Soviet Union preoccupied with guarding both her Western and her Eastern approaches and prepared to pursue a collaborative or concessionary policy. But is such an interpretation consistent with the Soviet missile and naval buildup, with provocative Soviet naval forays in different oceans of the world, with her indirect confrontation with the United States in the Middle East and Vietnam, and with her vigorous attempt to displace the United States in some Third World countries and more especially in Latin America where the United States has such substantial interests?

Whether all of this is consistent with the collaborative, concessionary interpretation will depend in part on one's view of Soviet political behavior. When an American newspaper headlines a story, "Soviet Officials Score Nixon on Middle East and Vietnam, but Look to Improved U.S. Ties," some U.S. readers might find an inconsistency in the Soviet statements that was not in the least experienced as such by the Soviet spokesmen.

It cannot be assumed that, if the Russians are genuinely concerned about their "two-front" position and want to pursue a détente policy, they must therefore be more "friendly." Even assuming that all aspects of Soviet behavior are under full central control, the Soviets are not disposed to interpret a détente as primarily a mutual determination to practice goodwill and friendly gestures. They are unlikely to feel themselves debarred from criticism and the pursuit of propaganda advantages and are not likely to attach substantive significance to broad discussions pursued in a relaxed and cordial atmosphere. A Soviet observer, speaking of earlier disappointed United States expectations, noted, "Who would *seriously* [emphasis added] expect that the pleasant Dobrynin-Rusk conversations held in the quiet offices of governmental departments, or even the conclusion of a few conversations between the two countries, would induce the USSR to abandon efforts to modernize her armed forces. . . ." Indeed the necessity of coming to agreements which are partly forced upon her by circumstances

beyond her control is likely to produce in Soviet leaders a need to maintain a tone of belligerency.

Nor can Soviet military growth be taken unequivocally as an indication of aggressive Soviet intents against Europe, the United States, or other countries in the Western (or neutral) camp. The Soviet attempt to achieve military parity or superiority has been the result of a long-term military procurement buildup. It is not at all clear just on what grounds we were entitled to expect that this development would cease, especially given both Soviet appreciation of the political value of military forces^{*} and her "two-front" situation. A strong Soviet desire to effect arrangements with the West by which each party would gain at least partially some of its objective and would, perhaps, be less capable of harming the other or at least have fewer incentives to do so, has little to do with any disposition on her part to trust the permanence of such arrangements. For the Soviets there is no contradiction between striving for such an arrangement and at the same time developing the military and political power that will provide greater assurance that the arrangements are adhered to, and which will safeguard her interests if they are not adhered to.

We have assumed (see above, p. 37) that the strength of her armed forces is -- together with the integrity of her borders, the adhesion of East Europe, and the defense of the Party -- one of the four minimal or core components of Soviet security objectives. If this is so, the Russians are not likely to leave themselves in an inferior strategic position (or even refrain from achieving a superior position) in order to placate the West. Pursuing a cooperative line with the West would be intended to increase Soviet security and not to provide psychotherapy for the West. To have pursued a cooperative line at the cost of foregoing an improved military posture relative to that of the United States, would have meant reducing a very tangible and certain

* Khrushchev got a good deal of political mileage out of an inferior strategic posture, but one lesson that the Soviet military may have impressed on Soviet leadership, if they needed any lessons after 1962, was the limitations of an aggressive political posture not supported by the requisite military power.

source of security *under Soviet control* (military strength) in order to increase security in another and less certain dimension (*détente*) that was *not under their control*.

Similarly, the Soviets have not tried to provide greater assurance to the United States or confidence in her intentions by sacrificing her Third World gains. The Russians have made sacrifices to gain the goodwill of the Third World countries themselves, but this is another matter, since it is relations with them that they seek to establish and consolidate.

It is not at all clear, then, that the Soviet pursuit of strategic parity or superiority, her increased military presence in different parts of the world, her attempts to displace the United States in Third World areas (other than Asia!) indicate a Soviet disinterest in various negotiated arrangements that might ease a number of points of difference between her and the United States and lay the groundwork for other political and economic agreements that the Soviets might find of special relevance with respect to the China policy of both powers.

It is possible that later during the seventies the United States will find itself able to extract from the Soviet Union a much higher price than at present for a *détente* and for a willingness not to profit at Soviet expense from pressures exercised by China. But the United States does not seem to be prepared as yet, and quite understandably, to use her potential relations with China as a bargaining lever or form of explicit pressure as Japan has done with the Soviets since 1961. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, the evolution of the U.S.-S.U.-China triangle^{*} has not yet reached the stage where pressures, threats, or negotiations bearing on alignments and deals among the trio have developed as explicitly as they no doubt will as China becomes more powerful, as the velocity of United States relations with her grows, and as each power continues to reassess the probable behavior of the other two (or three) and takes such measures as it can to profit most, or be damaged least, by the circumstances inherent in their relations.

^{*} Or, more realistically, of the U.S.-S.U.-China-Japan quadrilateral.

The foregoing analysis suggests, then, that there is no necessary contradiction between, on the one hand, the hypothesis that the Soviets are deeply concerned with their "two-front" situation, and more especially with their future relations with China, and, on the other hand, their missile, naval, and Third World policies of the last years. Similarly, the analysis suggests that there is no necessary contradiction between these Soviet policies and the hypothesis of a Soviet desire to draw the West into agreements and collaborative relations that would minimize the dangers of her "two-front" situation.

That these are not contradictions does not, of course, prove that the Soviets have abandoned or are abandoning a "go it alone" policy that would leave them more free to seek gains at the expense of Western Europe, the United States and their allies.*

Nonetheless, which will in the long run predominate? Probably the collaborative policy (A). This guess is based on the following considerations. The Soviet Union can pursue the collaborative policy (A) without compromising her highest priority or core security objectives (see p. 37) and still retain plenty of scope for further political gains. On the other hand, the "go it alone," aggressive, noncollaborative policy (B), while giving her greater freedom in the future to pursue gains in the West, does risk her core objectives by staking Soviet national security on her ability in the future to handle possible hostility from both the East and the West, a danger all the greater given the possibility of a stronger and more united Europe than she now faces. An analogy with the pre-World War II period suggests itself. The Soviet Union was caught between the Nazis on the West and Japan on the East, and in these circumstances sought to effect a political rapprochement and a military alliance with Great Britain and France. In this case, too, as in the present period, she had to overcome a prior reluctance to deal with Western powers that she did not trust.

* This suggests a sharper distinction between the collaborative policy (A) and the expansionist policy (B) than is desirable. Let us repeat, therefore, the point made earlier (p. 60) that current Soviet behavior and her conduct in the near future are likely to contain strains of both of these tendencies that, after all, shade off into each other.

It is not self-evident that further Soviet gains in Europe or the West are worth the risks entailed if they bring her to a point of intense conflict with the United States and Western Europe and possibly East Europe. To "conquer" Europe or to "conquer" the world* have probably not been serious Soviet objectives for some time, if they ever were. Russia will very likely be content to maintain her grip over East Europe without attempting to add additional countries, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia. The realistic gains that she might make if she pursued an all-out aggressive policy (for example, reincorporating Berlin into East Germany) do not seem to be worth the risk at a time when she faces an uncertain future in the East.

The hypothesis that a Soviet aggressive policy is not a valid choice for the Soviet Union during the coming decade rests on one further condition -- the ability of the United States and Western Europe (and possibly Japan) to put up sufficient resistance to Soviet advances that involve acts unacceptable in international practice, breaches of agreements, and gross interference in the internal affairs of other nations. If the West does not have the military, political, or moral strength to counter possible Soviet aggressive moves, there is less need or incentive for the Soviets to pursue a collaborative policy in the future since, presumably, Western military and political capabilities and national morale will neither enable the West to threaten her in conjunction with China nor to aid her in ensuring that China is neutralized.

* A Soviet first-strike capability against the United States would seem to have as its primary utility for the Soviets a threat against the United States in the event of growing evidence of a possible realization of the Soviet Union's "worst case" -- a joint U.S.-Chinese attack on the Soviet Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alliluyeva, Svetlana, *Only One Year*, New York, 1969.
- Almarik, Andrei, "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?" *Survey*, Autumn 1969, pp. 45-79.
- , *Involuntary Journey to Siberia*, New York, 1970.
- Becker, A. S., and A. L. Horelick, *Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, The Rand Corporation, R-504-FF, 1970.
- Butwell, Richard (ed.), *Foreign Policy in the Developing Nations*, Lexington, Kentucky, 1969.
- Clissold, Stephen (ed.), *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968: A Documentary Survey*, New York and London, 1970.
- Duncan, W. Raymond, *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, London-Toronto, 1970.
- Ermarth, Fritz, "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power," *The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1969, pp. 31-40.
- Fontaine, André, *History of the Cold War*, Vol. 2, New York, 1969.
- Goldhamer, Herbert, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America*, Princeton, [in Press].
- Holbik, Karel, *The United States, The Soviet Union, and The Third World*, Hamburg, 1968.
- Horelick, Arnold L., *Soviet Middle East Policy: Origins and Prospects*, The Rand Corporation, P-4579, February 1971.
- , *The Soviet Union in the Seventies*, The Rand Corporation, P-4583, February 1971.
- Johnson, Cecil, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, New York, 1970.

- Kapur, Harish, "China and the Third World," *Mizan*, November-December, 1969, Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 294-312.
- Kende, Istvan, "Twenty-five Years of Local Wars," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), 1971 (1), pp. 5-22.
- Khrushchev, Nikita, *Khrushchev Remembers*, Boston, 1970.
- Kolkowicz, Roman, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives," *World Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 3, April 1971, pp. 431-451.
- Kramish, Arnold, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, Stanford, 1959.
- Leites, Nathan C., *A Study of Bolshevism*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.
- Mackintosh, J. M., *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, 1962.
- McLane, Charles B., *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*, Princeton, 1966.
- Mikoyan, Sergo, "NATO, the Soviet Union and European Security," *Orbis*, XIII (1), Spring 1969, pp. 59-68.
- Morison, David, "USSR and Third World: Ideal and Reality," *Mizan*, Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1970.
- Observer, *Message from Moscow*, New York, 1969.
- Oswald, J. Gregory, and Anthony J. Strover (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Latin America*, New York, 1970.
- , *Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960-1968*, Austin, Texas, 1970.
- Rubenstein, Alvin Z. (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1960.
- Speier, Hans, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," *World Politics*, Vol. 9, April 1957.
- Summers, Jr., H. G., "The Sino-Soviet Dispute," *Military Review*, LI (3), March 1971.
- Triska, Jan F., and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, 1968.
- Ulam, Adam B., *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67*, New York, 1968.
- , "Communist Doctrine and Soviet Diplomacy," *Survey*, Summer 1970, pp. 3-16.

Valkenier, Elizabeth K., "New Soviet Views on Economic Aid," *Survey*, No. 76, Summer 1970, pp. 17-29.

Wolfe, Thomas W., *Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970*, Baltimore, 1970.

